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I.  INTRODUCTION 
For the past forty years, efforts to limit or prohibit advertising to 
children have faced a powerful combination of political and constitutional 
limitations.  The political will and pressure have not been exerted to enact 
and enforce meaningful regulations that curtail, in all media, the 
proliferation of advertising directed at children.  Such advertising exploits 
the very market failures that governments around the world, including our 
own, seek to minimize.  Yet even when restrictions on advertising are 
enacted, they are inevitably met with constitutional challenges.  These two 
limitations—political and constitutional—rest, however, on faulty 
assumptions about human behavior in the marketplace.  This Article 
demonstrates that removing faulty assumptions reduces the logic of 
constitutional challenges, even under existing case law. 
Between the years 1990 and 2000, the amount of money spent by 
children doubled.1  In 2000, children twelve years old and younger 
accounted for $28 billion in personal spending and influenced $250 billion 
in family expenditures.2  The desire to advertise to children is further 
 * Senior Scholar and Distinguished Teaching Professor of Economics, 
Bowling Green State University. 
 ** Research Associate, Honors Scholar, Bowling Green State University. 
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 1. BARRIE GUNTER ET AL., ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN ON TV—CONTENT, 
IMPACT, AND REGULATION 2 (2005) (citing Lawlor & Prothero, The Established and 
Potential Mediating Variables in the Child’s Understanding of Advertising Intent:  
Towards a Research Agenda, 18 J. MARKETING MGMT. 481 (2002)).   
 2. Id. 
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increased by the fact that children have the largest future market potential 
of any consumer group.3  In addition, children in the United States spend 
an average of four to five hours per day watching some form of electronic 
media.4  The hours in front of the television add up to one-sixth of a child’s 
life, which is the equivalent of over sixty days per year of media influence.5  
While watching television, it is estimated that children view more than 
40,000 advertisements every year.6  Furthermore, the majority of the 
advertisements children see are for high-caloric or fatty foods, such as 
candy, sugary cereal, fast food, junk food, and soft drinks.7  
Is this form of commercial speech beneficial to child consumers?  Is 
advertising to children a form of discourse that increases product 
knowledge and helps children make informed decisions in the market?  
Most importantly, do children have enough knowledge and training to see 
through advertising ploys and biases and apply the proper weight to the 
seductive and misleading advertisements?8  Does advertising to children 
also affect the way they perceive reality and society?  Are children able to 
accurately perceive dangers and risks associated with the products they see 
on television?9  Are commercials conditioning our children to act the way 
 3. See James U. McNeal, Tapping the Three Kids’ Markets, AM. 
DEMOGRAPHICS, Apr. 4, 1998, at 37–39 (noting that brand loyalty is important to gain 
with children at a young age to ensure future consumption, and children have the most 
spending years ahead of them out of any age cohort). 
 4. R. Cook, Kids and Media, 2006 INT’L J. OF ADVER. AND MARKETING TO 
CHILDREN 29. 
 5. See id. 
 6. Dale Kunkel, Children and Television Advertising, in HANDBOOK OF 
CHILDREN AND THE MEDIA 375, 376 (Dorothy G. Singer & Jerome L. Singer eds., 
2001) (citing D. Kunkel & W. Gantz, Children’s Television Advertising in the Multi-
Channel Environment, 42 J. COMM. 134, 134–52 (1992)).  
 7. E. Katherine Battle & Kelly D. Brownell, Confronting a Rising Tide of 
Eating Disorders and Obesity:  Treatment vs. Prevention and Policy, 21 ADDICTIVE 
BEHAVS. 755, 761 (1996). 
 8. See Joel J. Davis, Ethics and Environmental Marketing, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 
81, 84 (1992) (arguing that regulations designed to protect consumers from the 
deceptive practices of businesses are often ineffectual or misused by companies).  Even 
though the Federal Trade Commission restricts what advertisers can say about their 
products, advertisers continue to say things that technically may be true, but are 
misleading due to the omission or obscuration of facts necessary for the public to 
properly interpret the advertisements.  Id.  That is, “marketers have a history of 
pushing regulatory guidelines to their limits, relying on scientific truths to substantiate 
their claims and ignoring the manner in which the typical consumer will interpret the 
claim.”  Id. 
 9. See generally Karl A. Boedecker, Fred W. Morgan, & Jeffrey J. Stoltman, 
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advertisers desire?10  The field of advertising assumes a rational 
consumer,11 but what should a nation do when confronted with the 
Excessive Consumption:  Marketing and Legal Perspectives, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 301 (1999) 
(outlining the dangers associated with excessive consumption of advertised products).  
Specifically, in trying to attract new customers to a market, advertisers may attract 
consumers who are less able than current customers to understand either how to use an 
item or the risks associated with the product.  Id. at 302.  For example, in 1990, Nabisco 
introduced a brand of cigarettes targeted at young, less-educated females.  Id.  
Subsequently, experts criticized this strategy, arguing that the specific segment of 
smokers the ads targeted was more vulnerable than adults to glamorized smoking.  Id. 
 10. See Omer Lee Reed, Jr., The Psychological Impact of TV Advertising and 
the Need for FTC Regulation, 13 AM. BUS. L.J. 171, 175–78 (1975) (noting the ways in 
which advertisers “condition” their audience to purchase products, just as psychologist 
Pavlov conditioned his dog to unknowingly salivate at the sound of a bell).  
 11. See Tamara R. Piety, “Merchants of Discontent”:  An Exploration of the 
Psychology of Advertising, Addiction, and the Implications for Commercial Speech, 25 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 377, 383 (2001).  Marketers assume rationality to justify their 
advertisements.  Id.  If, indeed, consumers do not make rational decisions, it follows 
that advertisements would be deceptive and coercive, influencing consumers through 
immoral means.  However, there is much debate over whether adults, let alone 
children, are rational consumers.  Piety argues, “behavioral research has discovered 
that human beings’ capacity to reason, even when employing what appears to be only 
‘reason,’ is subject to predictable biases.”  Id. at 402 (citing JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY:  HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)).  For 
instance, adults have the tendency to misread evidence as confirming their own 
previously established views, thus engaging in “confirmatory bias.”  Id.  The tobacco 
industry relies heavily on the “optimistic bias,” or “[t]he tendency to underestimate the 
probability that an undesirable occurrence . . . will happen to the individual.”  Id. at 403 
(citing Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behaviorism Seriously:  The 
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 658 (1999)).  Piety further 
argues that advertising may rely most heavily on “availability and representativeness 
biases,” or “[t]he tendency both to calculate probabilities on the basis of the most 
available, and often the most vivid, facts and to attribute greater weight to known 
occurrences than is appropriate.”  Id.  This bias infiltrates commercials through the 
concept of “brand identification.”  Id.  Thus, it is unclear if adults are the rational 
consumers the advertising industry claims they are.  
Furthermore, there is a large body of research indicating the irrationality of consumers.  
See generally Aradhna Krishna & Maureen Morrin, Does Touch Affect Taste?  The 
Perceptual Transfer of Product Container Haptic Cues, 34 J. CONSUMER RES. 807 
(2008).  Krishna and Morrin analyze the ways in which consumers perceptually transfer 
product packaging characteristics to judgments about the products themselves.  For 
instance, does food taste better when served on fine china rather than paper plates?  
Rationally speaking, the product containers should not affect the actual quality or taste 
of the products within those containers; however, packaging still affects people’s 
perceptions of the food’s taste.  Id. at 816–17.   
The prevalence of superstitious beliefs is also evidence of irrational consumer 
behavior.  See Thomas Kramer & Lauren Block, Conscious and Nonconscious 
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imbalance of power between large, deceptive advertisers and young 
children who are psychologically and intellectually at the opposite pole 
from the traditionally assumed rational consumer?  This Article argues that 
advertising to children should be treated as a special category of 
advertising due to the unique nature of the audience and the detrimental 
effects advertising has on America’s children.12  
This Article is organized as follows: Part II explores the harmful 
effects of advertising directed at children.  These adverse effects provide 
the evidence and reasons for stricter federal regulation of advertising to 
children and also provide courts with grounds to find that the state has a 
substantial interest in regulating such advertising.  Part III looks at the role 
politics, Congress, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) play in regulating advertising aimed 
at children.  While Congress and federal agencies must be mindful of the 
constitutional limitations on their ability to regulate advertising, their 
ability to craft meaningful legislation and regulations is the crucial first step 
in the process.  Part IV takes the next step and examines the history and 
current status of the “commercial speech doctrine,” which guides the 
courts’ analysis of the permissibility of the regulations promulgated by the 
various federal agencies.  While the government has a substantial interest 
in protecting children from certain speech, the government must overcome 
other critical factors in crafting its regulations.  Part V applies the 
constitutional test first developed in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. 
v. Public Service Commission to evaluate hypothetical regulations on 
Components of Superstitious Beliefs in Judgment and Decision Making, 34 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 783 (2008).  The authors document the existence and the influence of 
these superstitions, and show that when they are permitted to operate on a 
subconscious level, they have a “robust effect . . . on consumers’ satisfaction judgments 
and risk-taking behavior.”  Id. at 791.  For many, market decisions are governed by 
everything from lucky numbers to feng shui.  See id. at 783–85.  Billions of dollars 
annually are spent on tarot cards, astrology readings, and trinkets from competing 
religions, at least some of which logically must be false.   A perfectly informed actor 
would not spend his money on products that offered to do things they could not 
possibly do, like reveal the future or cast a spell on an enemy.  There is, therefore, no 
assumption of perfectly informed rational calculation in Kramer and Block’s account.  
See id. 
 12. See DALE KUNKEL ET AL., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, REPORT OF THE 
APA TASK FORCE ON ADVERTISING AND CHILDREN 1 (2004) (explaining the 
American Psychological Association’s evidence that confirms “children lack the 
cognitive skills and abilities . . . [to] . . . comprehend commercial messages in the same 
way as do more mature audiences” and concluding that children are “uniquely 
susceptible to advertising influence”).   
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advertising to children.13  Part V then concludes that increased government 
regulation can pass the courts’ intermediate scrutiny for commercial 
speech.  Part VI looks to Europe and Canada for ideas and ways to limit 
children’s exposure to unwanted advertising.  Part VII then anticipates and 
refutes the major counterarguments against increased regulation of 
advertising aimed at children. 
II.  THE DANGERS OF ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN:  INDIVIDUAL AND 
SOCIETAL HARM 
The vulnerability of children makes them especially deserving of 
protections from harmful influences.  The American Academy of 
Pediatrics noted that children younger than eight years old “accept 
advertising claims at face value” and are therefore “cognitively and 
psychologically defenseless against advertising.”14  The harm and risk to 
children is particularly acute.  A recent study estimates that a total ban on 
fast food advertising to children and adolescents “would reduce the 
number of overweight children ages [three to eleven] in a fixed population 
by 18 percent.”15  While arguments abound for a more robust commercial 
speech doctrine,16 special attention needs to be paid to children. 
An increased understanding of the direct and tangible harms that our 
children and society bear as a result of advertising aimed at this most 
vulnerable group of our community will increase the pressure to form 
meaningful regulations on advertising.  We cannot ignore the future long-
term risks that children face every time an advertiser broadcasts 
commercials directed at the youth of our nation.17 
 13. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 
(1980). 
 14. Victor C. Strasburger et al., Policy Statement, Children, Adolescents, and 
Advertising, 118 PEDIATRICS 2563, 2563 (2006). 
 15. Shin-Yi Chou et al., Fast-Food Restaurant Advertising on Television and 
Its Influence on Childhood Obesity, 51 J.L. & ECON., 599, 599 (2008). 
 16. See Daniel E. Troy, Commercial Speech:  Defending the Language of 
Capitalism, in SPEAKING FREELY:  THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN UNFETTERED SPEECH 67–
72 (1995) (arguing that information is not harmful but rather information allows people 
to understand their preferences and act in their best interests); see also Va. State Bd. of 
Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (suggesting society 
should “assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive 
their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means 
to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them”). 
 17. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of 
Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 220–25 (1995) (explaining that individuals make 
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A.  Advertisements Exploit Children’s Lack of Understanding 
For doctors, parents, teachers, and legal scholars alike, “[t]he 
underlying concern about television advertising is whether it exploits 
children.”18  Adults consider children to be particularly vulnerable to 
advertising because they possess less knowledge about the intent of 
advertisers and the processes by which advertisements are created.19  
Children are not born with any knowledge of advertising techniques or 
economic systems.20  Rather, their awareness of marketing develops only 
gradually with time and education.21  Thus, the American Academy of 
Pediatrics declared that advertising is inherently deceptive because 
children below certain ages do not have the capacity to fully realize the 
nature and quality of advertisements.22 
Children are more vulnerable to advertisements because unlike 
adults, they are not aware that the intended purpose of advertisements is to 
persuade people to buy products.23  Conversely, adults understand that 
advertisements are intentionally created to present products to appear as 
attractively as possible and often contain misleading or biased 
information.24  Furthermore, adults recognize “who pays for and produces 
advertisements” on television and that advertisements are “part of an 
economic system that depends on selling products.”25  Therefore, adults 
have the capability to react with informed decisions regarding television 
advertisements, but it is unclear if children possess the insight to interpret 
advertisements in the same context as adults do.  Additionally, evidence 
suggests that young children generally do not comprehend the persuasive 
intent of advertisements, displaying no cynicism toward or critical 
decisions and calculate risk based on unreliable sources and tend to “give too little 
weight to future benefits and costs as compared to present benefits and costs,” and that 
consumers tend to underestimate risks associated with situations). 
 18. GUNTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 3. 
 19. See generally Caroline Oates et al., Children’s Understanding of Television 
Advertising:  A Qualitative Approach, 9 J. MARKETING COMM. 59  (2003) (exploring 
children’s understanding of television using focus groups made up of children of 
different ages). 
 20. GUNTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 9. 
 21. See BARRIE GUNTER & ADRIAN FURNHAM, CHILDREN AS CONSUMERS:  
A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE YOUNG PEOPLE’S MARKET 123–24 (1998).  
 22. Steven Shelov et al., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Children, Adolescents, and 
Advertising, 95 PEDIATRICS 295, 295 (1995). 
 23. GUNTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 9.   
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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questioning of the information in advertisements that older children and 
adults display.26  When asked about the purpose of advertisements, the 
majority of children below six years of age cannot explain the selling 
purpose, and are therefore more likely to perceive the advertisement as 
truthful.27  However, the majority of children ages eight to twelve believe 
advertisements are truthful only some of the time, or not at all.28  This 
demonstrates that with time, children do gain a greater understanding of 
the reality of advertising.  The problem is that without life experiences and 
knowledge, many children see advertisements as providing unbiased 
information or entertainment programming rather than calculated 
salesmanship.29  What children do not realize is that the advertisements are 
highly biased and employ technology and special effects designed to 
convince the consumer to buy into the advertisers’ salesmanship.30 For 
these reasons, advertising to children is often misleading or untruthful to 
the consumer.31 
B.  Advertising’s Role in Enforcing Negative Societal Stereotypes 
In addition to the concern that advertising exploits children’s naiveté 
for economic gain, there is also the concern that advertising affects 
children’s perceptions of social reality.  Advertisers contribute to how and 
 26. GUNTER & FURNHAM, supra note 21, at 123. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 133. 
 29. See ROY F. FOX, HARVESTING MINDS:  HOW TV COMMERCIALS CONTROL 
KIDS 50 (1996). 
 30. See M. Joseph Sirgy & Chenting Su, The Ethics of Consumer Sovereignty 
in an Age of High Tech, 28 J. BUS. ETHICS 1, 5–9 (2000) (arguing that in a market based 
on technologically advanced products, consumer sovereignty is a fiction because in the 
high-tech world, consumers do not have access to the technical information they need 
about products, and even if they did it would be difficult for them to process 
information about quality in a way that would aid their decision).  
 31. In Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 
(1999), the Supreme Court affirmed that the government has a substantial interest in 
advertising that is not misleading.  See also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980) (holding that misleading commercial 
speech is not protected by the First Amendment).  If the Supreme Court is saying the 
government has a substantial interest in truthful advertising, it follows that the 
government also has an interest in regulating misleading advertising.  In other words, if 
advertising is misleading to child consumers, logically the government has a greater 
interest in regulating these advertisements.  If advertising to children misleads them 
due to a lack of knowledge and understanding, ignorance concerning the intention of 
marketers, and overall unfamiliarity with market processes, it appears the government 
has a substantial interest in the regulation of such advertisements. 
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what we think about other people and ourselves.  The danger is that 
advertising to children may encourage them to form unrealistic and clichéd 
opinions about society.32  For instance, children as young as three who are 
television viewers have more rigid attitudes about what jobs are 
appropriate for men and women compared to their peers who watch less 
television.33  Specifically, the nature of advertising in relation to gender 
generally demonstrates the following features:  Men are shown in more 
roles than women; women are shown in more family roles; a man’s world is 
outside the home; and women do activities in the home while men are the 
beneficiaries of these activities.34  Furthermore, an article from the New 
York Times entitled “What Are Commercials Selling to Children?” 
answers with “[a] world where food is sweet and blond is best,” girls like 
dolls, and “black children play supporting roles.”35 
C.  Advertising’s Effect on Children’s Health 
Special consideration for children’s health is necessary because 
advertisements for food products make up the majority of advertisements 
directed at children, and most of the advertised foods are unhealthy.36  
Specifically, eighty percent of commercials directed toward children are for 
food.37  Furthermore, one study indicates that only a small percentage of 
food commercials contain nutritional information about the product.38  
Thus, there is little disclosure about fat content or high sodium levels 
during advertisements directed at children.39  In addition, the amount of 
children’s advertising has not remained constant since previous decades.40  
 32. See generally GUNTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 130–32 (explaining the 
negative effects of advertising on stereotyping). 
 33. FOX, supra note 29, at 13. 
 34. Id. at 14. 
 35. John J. O’Conner, What Are Commercials Selling to Children?, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 4, 1988, at C20. 
 36. SUSAN ELLIOT ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC FINAL STAFF REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATION 49–50 (1981).   
 37. Dan Glickman, Sec’y of Agric., USDA Symposium on Childhood 
Obesity:  Causes and Prevention 4 (Oct. 27, 1998) (transcript available at 
http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/1998/10/0445). 
 38. See Aya Kuribayashi et al., Actual Nutritional Information of Products 
Advertised to Children and Adults on Saturday, 30 CHILDREN’S HEALTH CARE 309, 
318–19 (2001). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN 
CHILDHOOD OBESITY 1 (2004) (noting that in recent years there has been an 
“explosion in media targeted to children”). 
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The number of advertisements directed at children has steadily increased 
over the past twenty years and has doubled since the 1970s.41  During the 
same period, the rate of children’s obesity more than tripled, rising from 
four to fifteen percent.42  The important message when discussing 
advertising is that studies link the increase in advertisements for unhealthy 
foods directed at children with the growing rates of childhood obesity.43  
That is, evidence suggests that exposure to food advertising affects 
children’s food preferences and eating behavior.44 
Furthermore, a large body of evidence suggests that advertisers of 
unhealthy foods and sedentary entertainment products for children may be 
causing premature death by obesity and related diseases.45  In particular, 
health conditions such as heart disease, diabetes, and stroke result from 
patterns of low levels of physical activity and a poor diet.46  These dangers 
exist because not only does obesity cause health problems for children, but 
poor eating habits developed during childhood persist throughout one’s 
life.47  Obesity is not merely a personal problem—obesity is a 
governmental concern due to the high costs it is inflicting on the United 
States healthcare system.48  Currently, obesity is the second largest 
 41. See id. at 4 (stating that the average number of television commercials 
children viewed in the 1970s was approximately 20,000 per year and is currently 
estimated to exceed an average of 40,000 per year). 
 42. William A. Ramsey, Note, Rethinking Regulation of Advertising Aimed at 
Children, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 361, 368 (2006). 
 43. KUNKEL ET AL., supra note 12 (citing W. Dietz, You Are What You Eat—
What You Eat Is What You Are, J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE, Jan. 1990, at 76; K. B. 
Horgan et al., Television Food Advertising:  Targeting Children in a Toxic 
Environment, in THE HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN AND MEDIA 447, 450 (D.G. Singer & 
J.L. Singer eds., 2001)).    
 44. See COMM. ON FOOD MKTG. & THE DIETS OF CHILDREN & YOUTH, INST. 
OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., FOOD MARKETING TO CHILDREN AND YOUTH:  
THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY? 257–58 (J. Michael McGinnis et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter 
THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY]; GERARD HASTINGS ET AL., CENTER FOR SOCIAL 
MARKETING, REVIEW OF RESEARCH ON THE EFFECTS OF FOOD PROMOTION TO 
CHILDREN:  FINAL REPORT (2003). 
 45. Bill Jeffery, The Supreme Court of Canada’s Appraisal of the 1980 Ban of 
Advertising to Children in Quebec:  Implications for “Misleading” Advertising 
Elsewhere, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 237, 238 (2006). 
 46. Id.  
 47. KUNKEL ET AL., supra note 12, at 12. 
 48. Jeffrey P. Koplan & William H. Dietz, Caloric Imbalance and Public 
Health Policy, 282 JAMA 1579, 1579 (1999) (noting that direct and indirect obesity 
costs contribute to approximately 10% of the United States healthcare budget). 
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re well documented, and the link between obesity and 
adve




States.49  In addition to the hundreds of thousands of deaths caused by 
obesity each year, it is estimated that obesity costs the American 
healthcare system seventy billion dollars per year.50   
These harms a
rtising aimed at children is clear.51  The World Health Organization, 
the Kaiser Family Foundation, the British Food Commission, and the 
Institutes of Medicine, just to name a few, all acknowledge the harmful 
health effects associated with junk food advertising targeting children.52  
“Food and beverage advertisers alone spend between $10 billion to $12 
billion a year targeting youth.”53  Advertising harmful food to vulnerable 
children calls for meaningful regulation. 
While case law defines the parameters of the commercial sp
ine, it is the administrative agencies that have the regulatory power 
over advertising policy in the United States.  Almost since the inception of 
television, Congress has provided the authority to regulate broadcasting.  
In 1934, Congress passed the Communications Act, requiring “that 
television be regulated for the ‘public convenience, interest, or 
necessity.’”54  However, the history of advertising regulations demonstrates 
an uneasiness about aggressively regulating commercial speech.55  The two 
most powerful government agencies that oversee and enforce regulations 
effecting advertising directed at children are the FCC and the FTC.56  Since 
 49. Id.   
man, supra note 37. 
TY, supra note 44, at 8–10 (presenting the 
s 
ar hild
t Getz, “Drowned in Advertising Chatter”:  The Case for Regulating 
Gaylord A. Jentz, Federal Regulation of Advertising:  False 
ati
ncy that regulates all advertising, while 
 50. Glick
 51. THREAT OR OPPORTUNI
committee’s findings on the relationship between advertising and childhood obesity).  
 52. Susan Linn & Josh Golin, Beyond Commercials:  How Food Marketer
T get C ren, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 13, 14 (2006).  
 53. Id. 
 54. Mat
Ad Time on Television, 94 GEO. L.J. 1229, 1253 (2006) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 307 
(2000)). 
 55. 
Represent ons of Composition, Character, or Source and Deceptive Television 
Demonstrations, 6 AM. BUS. L.J. 409, 411 (1968) (explaining that the common law 
principle of caveat emptor, which allowed a marketer or producer to “huff and puff his 
wares,” was fixed in U.S. law).  Furthermore, “[t]he concept of privity of contract as a 
prerequisite for recovery also added to the plight of the consumer, thus the thought of 
regulation was even greeted with hostility.”  Id. 
 56. The FTC is the primary federal age
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child in the age group to which the toy was targeted, and while an adult 
at least the 1970s, both the FCC57 and the FTC58 have been aware of the 
dangers of advertising to children.59  The FTC’s authority to regulate 
advertising directed at children is derived from Section 5 of the FTC Act, 
which broadly prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce.60  
When an advertisement is targeted to a specific audience, such as children, 
the FTC determines the effect it has on a reasonable member of that 
group—an ordinary child.61  Specifically, the FTC has the power to regulate 
misleading commercials.62  The FTC has investigated numerous cases 
challenging deceptive performance claims in toy advertisements.63  When 
considering regulation of commercials, it is important to note that in each 
of these cases, the advertisement was examined from the viewpoint of a 
 
other advertising agencies exercise jurisdiction over certain products and forms of 
media.   See Ross D. Petty, FTC Advertising Regulation:  Survivor or Casualty of the 
Reagan Revolution?, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 1–2, 33 (1992) (explaining that states and other 
federal agencies are increasingly regulating advertising as well).  Additionally, “[a]ll 
fifty states have ‘little FTC acts’ and several have other advertising statutes.”  Id. at 1 
n.1.  
 57. Children’s Television Report & Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 11 
(1974). 
 58. See J. Howard Beales III, Remarks at the George Mason Law Review 
2004 Symposium on Antitrust and Consumer Protection:  Competition, Advertising, 
and Health Claims:  Legal and Practical Limits on Advertising Regulation 6 (Mar. 2, 
2004) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/beales/040312childads.pdf) 
(hereinafter Beales’s Remarks). 
 59. Tracy Westen, Government Regulation of Food Marketing to Children:  
The Federal Trade Commission and the Kid-Vid Controversy, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 79, 
80–81 (2006) (noting that by 1977, the FTC knew that children saw at least 20,000 
commercial television ads a year, and that the children could not distinguish between 
commercials and programs). 
 60. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000). 
 61. See In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 177–78 (1984) (“When 
representations . . . are targeted to a specific audience, the Commission determines the 
effect of the practice on a reasonable member of that group.”). 
 62. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (empowering the Commission to prevent use of 
“deceptive acts . . . in or affecting commerce”). 
 63. See, e.g., In re Hasbro, Inc., 116 F.T.C. 657 (1993) (commercials and 
packaging used materially altered toys to advertise exaggerated features and 
characteristics); In re Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 187 (1991) (false and 
misleading advertisements ranged from depicting toys doing things without human 
assistance to packaging showing additional toys that were not included); In re Gen. 
Mills Fun Group, Inc., 93 F.T.C. 749 (1979) (misleading advertisement implied children 
could control the speed and direction of the toy after launch); In re Mattel, Inc., 79 
F.T.C. 667 (1971) (misrepresentations in packaging and advertising of Hot Wheels and 
Dancerina Doll).  
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n entirely successful in regulating 
adve
 advertising for any product which is directed to, 
or seen by, audiences composed of a significant proportion of children 
food products directed to, or 
seen by, audiences composed of a significant proportion of older 
televised advertising for sugared food products not 
included in Paragraph (b), which is directed to, or seen by, audiences 
 
viewer might not consider the commercial misleading, the advertisement 
may prove misleading to children.  
Despite some recent successes in regulating misleading advertising in 
general, the FTC has not bee
rtisements directed at children.  In the United States, the first 
comprehensive efforts to regulate advertising to children were made in the 
1970s.64  Interest groups, such as Action for Children’s Television (ACT), 
spearheaded the push for regulation of children’s advertising in the United 
States.65  Such petitions and lobbying prompted the FTC to investigate the 
effects of advertising on children from 1971 to 1973.66  In 1978, the FTC 
issued a notice of proposed rulemaking, which recommended regulation of 
advertisements aired during children’s television.67  Four advocacy 
organizations—ACT, the Center for Science in the Public Interest, the 
Consumers Union of America, and the Committee on Children’s 
Television—petitioned the FTC to act in the area of children’s 
advertisements.68  In its notice of proposed rulemaking, the Commission 
proposed the following: 
(a) Ban all television
who are too young to understand the selling purpose of or otherwise 
comprehend or evaluate the advertising; 
(b) Ban televised advertising for sugared 
children, the consumption of which poses the most serious dental 
health risks; 
(c) Require 
 64. GUNTER & FURNHAM, supra note 21, at 184 (discussing FTC attempts to 
ban all advertising directed at young children).   
 65. Tracy Reilly, The “Spiritual Temperature” of Contemporary Popular 
Music:  An Alternative to the Legal Regulation of Death-Metal and Gangsta-Rap Lyrics, 
11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 335, 369–73 (2009).  The group has since disbanded but 
was responsible for numerous petitions to the Federal Communications Commission 
and for bringing several suits in federal court.   
 66. FCC Children’s Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 
1–2 (1974).   
 67. FTC, Children’s Advertising, 43 Fed. Reg. 17967 (proposed Apr. 27, 
1978). 
 68. Id. at 17968. 
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ting 
children’s advertisements ensued.  
prod
TC seems reluctant to completely ban 
adve
 
composed of a significant proportion of older children, to be balanced 
by nutritional and/or health disclosures funded by advertisers.69 
Public and political opposition to the FTC’s idea of regula
70  Consumer organizations, broadcasters,
uct manufacturers, advertising agencies, and individual consumers 
submitted hundreds of written comments, totaling 60,000 pages.71  
Subsequently, FTC staff terminated the rulemaking proceeding because 
workable solutions to regulate child-oriented television advertising were 
not available at the time.72  Furthermore, the FTC determined that it 
lacked the resources to pursue further the regulation of children’s 
advertising.73  Even worse for the future of the FTC, the failed attempt at 
regulation was not taken lightly.  The notice of proposed rulemaking led to 
“Congress [allowing] the agency’s funding to lapse, and the agency was 
literally shut down for a brief time.”74  “It was more than a decade after the 
FTC terminated the rulemaking before Congress . . . reauthorize[d] the 
agency” to make policy regarding children’s advertising or any substantially 
similar proceeding.75  This proposed regulation was by far the most 
exhaustive examination ever undertaken to restrict advertising to children, 
and ever since the regulation’s failure, a negative stigma has plagued the 
realm of advertising regulation.76 
When considering the possibility for future regulations, it is important 
to note that “[t]he [current] F
rtising aimed at children” because of its past failure and the political 
 69. Id. at 17969.  Children too young to understand the purposes of 
advertising were considered to be those under the age of eight.  Id.  Older children 
were considered to be those between the ages of eight and twelve.  Id. 
 70. See Editorial, The FTC as National Nanny, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1978, at 
A22 (describing the FTC’s proposed regulations as protecting children from the 
weakness of their parents, not from sugar-coated cereals). 
 71. ELLIOT ET AL., supra note 36, at 13. 
 72. FTC Children’s Advertising, 46 Fed. Reg. 48710, 48713 (rulemaking 
proceeding terminated Oct. 2, 1981). 
 73. Id. 
 74. J. Howard Beales III, Advertising to Kids and the FTC:  A Regulatory 
Retrospective That Advises the Present, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 873, 879 n.3 (2004) 
(citing A.O. Sulzberger Jr., After Brief Shutdown, F.T.C. Gets More Funds, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 2, 1980, at D1) (“[S]hutting down a single agency because of disputes over policy 
decisions is almost unprecedented.”).  
 75. Id. at 880. 
 76. See FTC, Children’s Advertising, 43 Fed. Reg. 17967 (proposed Apr. 27, 
1978). 
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views of FTC commissioners.77  That is, many of the commissioners of the 
FTC are against any further regulation of advertising to children, and so 
the regulations are not pursued.  Former FTC Chairman Timothy Muris 
believed that regulating advertising to children would not solve the 
“obesity epidemic” in the United States.78  Similarly, former FTC 
Commissioner Orson Swindle believed that industry should lead efforts to 
regulate itself, with the government in a backup enforcement position.79  
Likewise, former Commissioner J. Howard Beales III believed that the 
ramifications of the FTC’s attempt to regulate advertising aimed at 
children in the 1970s would dictate the FTC’s current policies80 and that the 
FTC “will tread very carefully when responding to calls to restrict truthful 
advertising to children.”81  Therefore, the current FTC stance does not 
provide much optimism for federal agency regulation of advertising to 
children in the near future.  It remains to be seen whether the Obama 
administration appoints commissioners who are more willing to regulate 
advertising directed at children.  Thus, children’s advocates must 
increasingly look to Congress, and then the Supreme Court, for hope. 
In the 1980s, pressure from consumer action groups such as ACT 
began to escalate again, and this time the pressure led the FCC to 
 investigate advertising to children.  However, in its subsequent 
report, the FCC stated that there was “no basis in the record to apply a 
national mandatory quota for children’s programming.”82  Despite the 
attempts of ACT to get the FCC to limit advertising, advertising to children 
was still without regulation.   
This lack of regulation gave rise to one of the first direct court 
challenges to children’s adve
 77. Ramsey, supra note 42, at 382. 
 78. Danny Kucharsky, Targeting Kids, MARKETING MAG., July 12, 2005, at 6.   
Former Chairman Muris elaborated:  “‘I think banning marketing is a distraction.  
Even our dogs and cats are fat . . . and it’s not because they’re watching too much 
advertising.’”  Id. 
 79. Orson Swindle, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Advertising Issues Before 
the Federal Trade Commission (Apr. 28, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.ftc. 
gov/speeches/swindle/040428aaf.htm). 
 80. See Beales, supra note 74, at 880 (explaining that the FTC must recognize 
that grossly overreaching regulation was not well-received in the 1970s, and, 
considering the present ability of parents to control programming with technology, that 
task may be better left to parents). 
 81. Beales’s Remarks, supra note 58, at 14. 
 82. Children’s Television Programming & Adver. Practices, 96 F.C.C.2d 634, 
656 (1984). 
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 (ACT I).83  The court decided to uphold the FCC decision to 
deregulate children’s television, effectively eliminating any enforceable 
regulations on advertising to children.84  ACT again filed suit in 1987, 
challenging the deregulation decision of 1984.85  Action for Children’s 
Television v. FCC (ACT II) reversed the FCC’s earlier decision finding 
market forces effectively regulated children’s television.86  This 
deregulation lasted roughly three years until increasing congressional 
pressures resulted in legislation.87  Though there have been numerous 
attempts to pass legislation aimed at regulating advertising to children, the 
first successful attempt was the Children’s Television Act of 1989.88  
However, the primary objective of this bill was to regulate children’s 
television in general.89  Advertising comprised only a small portion of the 
bill.90  It was, instead, focused on increasing the amount of educational 
 83. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (ACT I), 756 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 
Id. at 901 (upholding the FCC’s decision to deregulate children’s 
Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (ACT II), 821 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. 
7). 
Id. at 745–50 (examining almost all of the relevant arguments present in 
ectively regulated by marketplace forces . . . [and 
Id. at 
O. 101-385, at 12 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 




television including lifting the limitations on advertising).  The court held that the FCC 
was “within the broad scope of its discretion and was adequately explained by the 1984 




the debate).  Finding that children do deserve a special protection, the court stated:  
“In sum, we find that the Commission has failed to explain adequately the elimination 
of its long-standing children’s television commercialization guidelines, and we 
therefore remand to the Commission for elaboration on that issue.”  Id. at 750.  Before 
ACT II, the FCC found that: 
 “commercial levels will be eff
that] if stations exceed the tolerance level of viewers . . . the market will 
regulate itself. . . .”  The Commission reached this overall conclusion 
notwithstanding ACT’s evidence, presented in the notice-and-comment 
proceedings, that market forces do not effectually regulate the commercial 
content of children’s television. Indeed, the Commission’s 1984 Report failed 
to address that evidence or, for that matter, even to mention the children’s 
television commercialization policy. 
744 (citations omitted). 
 87. See H.R. REP. N
1605, 1617 (describing attempts to pass legislation regulating children’s television 
advertising). 
 88. I
 89. Id. at
 90. Id. 
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sion of Congress, the Children’s Television Act 
was 
(1) the FCC to establish standards for broadcasters regarding the 
(2) broadcasters to limit the amount of commercial time aired during 
upreme Court’s 
willin
programming and content.91  But the regulation’s success was short-lived.  
President Ronald Reagan exercised a pocket veto of the bill and ten days 
later the bill was dead.92   
In the following ses
revived as the proposed Children’s Television Act of 1990 (CTA).93  
With the exception of state-led actions against tobacco advertising to 
children, the CTA is the latest progression in the area of regulating 
advertising to children.  The CTA instructed the FCC to enforce 
regulations for television broadcasters.94  Specifically, the CTA required:  
amount of children’s television programming aired; and  
children’s television programs to 10.5 minutes per hour or less on 
weekends and 12 minutes per hour or less on weekdays.95   
When passing the CTA, Congress considered the S
gness to limit speakers’ First Amendment protections to regulate 
advertising for the purpose of protecting children,96 as the Court did in 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.97  Importantly, Congress passed the bill on the 
grounds that children have diminished capacity to understand the 
persuasive aim of advertising.98  Congress believed a balance must be 
 
 91. Id. at 17. 
es J. Popham, Passion, Politics and the Public Interest:  The Perilous 
at ive Standard in the Regulation of Children’s Television 
ing procedures for the FCC, set standards for compliance, and ordered the 
. 726, 749–50 (1978) (holding that the 
fies special treatment and regulation of 
h e pr
ed that “children cannot distinguish conceptually 
 92. Jam
P h to a Quantitat
Programming, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 7 (1997) (citing Irwin Motolotsky, Reagan 
Vetoes Bill Putting Limits on TV Programming for Children, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1988, 
at A1). 
 93. See generally H.R. 1677, 101st Cong. (1990).  The proposed act prescribed 
rulemak
FCC to proceed with children’s advertisement regulation process.  See generally id. 
 94. Children’s Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996 
(1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 95. 47 U.S.C. §§ 303a(a)–(b) (2006). 
 96. H.R. REP. NO. 101-385, at 8–9. 
 97. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S
state’s interest in protecting children justi
ot erwis otected expression). 
 98. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-385, at 5 (1989) (noting that the FCC had, in its 
1974 policy statement, conclud
between programming and advertising” and are “far more trusting of and vulnerable to 
commercial ‘pitches’ than are adults”). 
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attained between the advertising revenue necessary to support children’s 
television and protection of those children from overcommercialization.99   
Unfortunately, in 1996 the FCC Task Force found that little had been 
done to change children’s television since the enactment of the CTA in 
1990.100  The necessary balance between advertising revenue and 
regulations was hindering meaningful progress.101  The incentive for 
broadcasters to regulate their advertisements in addition to increasing their 
children’s programming was nonexistent.  For these reasons, there remain 
few limits on the content of advertising to children.102 
It should be mentioned that, in addition to FTC and FCC efforts to 
regulate, there has been self-regulation of advertising to children.103  Until 
 99. See § 101, 104 Stat. at 996.  The law notes, “the financial support of 
advertisers assists in the provision of programming to children,” and that “special 
’S TELEVISION PROGRAMMING, FCC 96-335 (1996), available 
t 
ng to children 
ctive laws never make it out of Congress.  For example, the 
event 
om advertising.  See, e.g., 
safeguards are appropriate to protect children from overcommercialization on 
television.”  Id. 
 100. See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, POLICIES AND RULES 
CONCERNING CHILDREN
a http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mass_Media/Orders/1996/fcc96335.htm. 
 101. Id. ¶¶ 29–34. 
 102. Little progress has been made on regulating advertisi
because many of the prospe
Voluntary Alcohol Advertising Standards for Children Act, H.R. 1292, 105th Cong. 
(1997), was introduced to curtail advertising by the alcohol industry that appealed to 
children and teens.  Congress found that “[t]elevision advertising influences children’s 
perception of the values and behavior that are common and acceptable in society.”  Id. 
§ 2.  Additionally, it noted that “[t]he most popular beer ads use animated characters, 
animals, or music which also amuse and attract children and teens.”  Id.  The reasoning 
behind the bill was almost identical to the case law surrounding targeted advertising of 
alcohol and tobacco to children—protection and well-being of children.  Id.; see 
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 749–50.  However, the bill did not leave the House.   
The Protect Children From E-Mail Smut Act of 2001, H.R. 2472, 107th Cong. (2001), 
was also enacted to protect vulnerable children.   This bill was introduced to pr
children from receiving unsolicited e-mail advertisements about sexually oriented 
material.  Id. § 2.  Once again, the bill never left the House.   
 103. In addition to self-regulation, The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
has taken steps within its jurisdiction to protect consumers fr
Department of Health and Human Services, 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, & 807 (2009) 
(detailing the reporting and labeling requirements for medical devices).  In 1996, the 
FDA passed an order restricting the advertising of tobacco products.  Regulations 
Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect 
Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44396 (Aug. 28, 1996).  The rule provided 
several limitations on tobacco advertising, including limitations on the placement of 
ads, the locations of billboard ads, tobacco industry involvement in sports, and the sale 
of branding merchandise.  Id. at 44399.  The FDA promoted such a rule due to the 
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1990, when the CTA was passed, the FCC was still in favor of letting the 
market regulate itself.104  The Children’s Advertising Review Unit 
(CARU), which works under the Better Business Bureau and advertising 
industry trade associations, monitors advertising directed to children and 
advertising which it views as likely to suggest that children undertake 
unsafe activities.105  CARU has voluntary guidelines for advertising to 
children under the age of twelve.106  Furthermore, because industry self-
regulation is not government action, and therefore not subject to First 
Amendment protections, self-regulation may be more flexible and 
aggressive at addressing concerns about children’s advertising.107  
The trend toward greater First Amendment protection for 
commercial speech and government agencies’ fear of tackling regulation 
for children’s advertising highlights conflicting values and priorities 
between the public welfare of children and individual and commercial 
expression rights.  The often contradictory views of the legislative and 
judicial branches create great turmoil in the ongoing discourse about 
advertising to children.  Despite the Supreme Court’s finding that the 
protection of children is a state interest, the United States is unable to 
forge new laws and regulations without the support and ingenuity of 
agencies and lawmakers.108  Yet, public pressure and federal regulation 
remain the starting point and possibly the best avenue to pursue limits on 
advertising to children.109   
increase in underage tobacco use and growing popularity of tobacco advertisement 
figures.  The FDA’s order was responsible for the removal of many popular advertising 
methods and probably stemmed from the failed Senate bill to place limitations on 
alcohol and tobacco advertising.  See id. 
 104. H.R. REP. NO. 101-385, at 3–4 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1605, 1607–08. 
 105. Richard A. Kurnit, Advertising and Unfair Competition Issues, SF74 ALI-
ABA 449, 476 (2001). 
LINES FOR CHILDREN’S ADVERTISING 4 (2004). 
ricious, and 
, the FCC is prone to regulatory 
Consumer Protection Statutes, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 277, 289–90 (2006) 
 106. CHILDREN’S ADVER. REVIEW UNIT, COUNCIL OF BETTER BUS. BUREAUS, 
SELF-REGULATORY GUIDE
 107. Beales’s Remarks, supra note 58, at 5. 
 108. See Getz, supra note 54, at 1258 (“First, the FCC can be cap
abandon its own longstanding rules . . . .  Second
capture . . . .  Third, when the FCC doesn’t want to do something, it can delay for a 
long time.”). 
 109. Joseph M. Price & Rachel F. Bond, Litigation as a Tool in Food 
Advertising:  
(noting that relying on litigation “to resolve the issues raised by food advertising to 
children requires courts to regulate business and juries to decide complicated issues of 
health and science—tasks that are better suited to the other branches of government”). 
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protection, such as political speech, and that which is afforded less or 
This Article now turns to the Supreme Court and its jurisprudence to 
explore the constitutional and legal confines in which the FTC, FCC, and 
Congress must adopt meaningful regulations and laws.  This Article argues 
for an expansion of authority by which the government may regulate 
advertising aimed at children.  
IV.  CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS:  THE EVOLVING COMMERCIAL 
SPEECH DOCTRINE 
The restriction of commercial speech, even for the protection of 
children, is vigorously debated in current litigation and throughout existing 
jurisprudence.  Just as the interests of advertisers and children clash in the 
marketplace, commercial speech regulation and First Amendment rights 
clash within the courts.  Examining the history of speech regulation reveals 
that the evolving limits on commercial speech regulation provide a better 
understanding of the current debate about advertising to children.   
To begin, the text of the First Amendment makes no distinction 
between commercial and noncommercial speech.110  The First Amendment 
provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech.”111  The Framers of the Constitution left open the full meaning of 
the First Amendment, leaving it to the courts and future generations to 
determine the freedoms afforded to commercial speech.112  However, “[i]t 
has been clear since [the Supreme] Court’s earliest decisions concerning 
the freedom of speech that the state may sometimes curtail speech when 
necessary to advance a significant and legitimate state interest.”113  The 
balancing of freedom of speech and significant state interests is at the heart 
of advertising regulation. 
In the twentieth century, “[t]he Supreme Court began to distinguish 
between speech which is afforded the most expansive First Amendment 
 
 110. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 111. Id. cls. 1, 2. 
 112. ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 16 
(1941) (noting that the drafters of the First Amendment found free speech important, 
but did not say much about its exact meaning).  See also Alex Kozinski & Stuart 
Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747, 
749 (1993) (discussing the First Amendment failure to explain such critical words as 
speech, freedom, and abridging). 
 113. Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 
804 (1984) (citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)). 
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entral Hudson, the Supreme Court provided the analytical 
fram
 
possibly no protection.”114 The Constitution, the Supreme Court held, 
“accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other 
constitutionally guaranteed expression.  The protection available for 
particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the 
expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation.”115  
The commercial speech doctrine has been a notoriously unstable and 
contentious domain of American jurisprudence,116 and the Supreme Court 
Justices themselves remain divided on how to regulate commercial 
speech.117 
In C
ework for evaluating the constitutionality of regulations on 
commercial speech.118  The regulation must survive a four-part test.119  As a 
threshold matter, the court must first inquire if the communication is 
“misleading” or “related to unlawful activity.”120  If it is not misleading or 
unlawful, the inquiry continues.121  “The State must assert a substantial 
interest to be achieved by restriction on commercial speech,” “the 
restriction must directly advance the state interest involved,” and the 
restriction must not be “more extensive than is necessary to serve that 
interest.”122  The next section will discuss this test in greater detail, and 
demonstrate that more aggressive regulations aimed at curtailing or 
prohibiting advertising to children can withstand constitutional scrutiny.  
 114. Robert Sprague, Business Blogs and Commercial Speech:  A New 
Analytical Framework for the 21st Century, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 127, 139 (2007) (stating 
that “in Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, the Court provided examples of speech 
which are provided no protection:  ‘the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, 
and the insulting or “fighting words”—those which by their very utterance inflict injury 
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace’” (quoting Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))). 
 115. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 
(1980) (citations omitted). 
 116. See generally Soontae An, From a Business Pursuit to a Means of 
Expression:  The Supreme Court’s Disputes Over Commercial Speech from 1942 to 
1976, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 201 (2003). 
 117. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J., 
concurring); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 645 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 580 
(Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 597 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 118. Central Hudson, 477 U.S. at 566. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 564. 
 121. See id. 
 122. Id. at 564–66. 
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In Valentine t first made the 
distin
However, both before and after Central Hudson, the Court h
loped its commercial speech doctrine.  Examining this case law is 
beneficial to the argument for increased regulation of advertising to 
children because through examining court rulings, we can determine if 
increased regulation of advertising to children is feasible in our current 
legal environment.  Understanding the parameters of commercial speech 
precedent provides the foundation necessary for drafting new public policy.  
It is essential for lawmakers to know where the courts stand on the 
protection of children and commercial speech before they can create 
constitutional regulations to shield children from the dangers of 
advertising. Furthermore, cases such as FCC v. Pacifica Foundation and 
New York v. Ferber  provide the legal validation for arguing that the 
government’s protection of children is a state interest.123  Through an 
examination of case law relevant to commercial speech and advertising to 
children, this Article provides justification for the increased regulation of 
advertising to children.  What follows is a brief summary of a few of the 
most important commercial speech cases affecting advertising to children 
since commercial speech was first recognized in 1942.   
A.  Valentine v. Chrestensen (1942)
v. Chrestensen, the Supreme Cour
ction between commercial and noncommercial speech, with the 
former receiving no constitutional protection.124  Chrestensen, a citizen of 
Florida, owned a former United States Navy submarine moored at a state 
pier in New York’s East River, which he exhibited to spectators for 
profit.125  To promote his venture, he distributed leaflets on the streets of 
New York advertising the submarine.126  The respondent was subsequently 
confronted by city police and told that distributing leaflets for commercial 
gain violated the New York City Sanitary Code.127  Chrestensen responded 
 
 123. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757–58 (1982) (holding that the 
, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). 
ew York law stated:   
Handbills, cards and circulars. on shall throw, cast or distribute or 
physical and emotional health of children is a compelling interest); FCC v. Pacifica 
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749–51 (1978). 
 124. Valentine v. Chrestensen
 125. Id. at 52–53. 
 126. Id. at 53. 
 127. Id.  The N
—No pers
cause or permit to be thrown, cast or distributed, any handbill, circular, card, 
booklet, placard or other advertising matter whatsoever, in or upon any street 
or public place, or in a front yard or court yard, or on any stoop, or in the 
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commercial speech continued to be fiercely debated.134  Thirty years later, 
 
by altering the handbills to include a protest announcement on one side of 
the leaflet so the handbill would be considered political speech.128  Despite 
the alteration, the police prohibited the distribution of the leaflets, and the 
respondent then filed suit.129 
The district and appellate courts both held that the New York City 
Code banning the distribution of the leaflets was unconstitutional.130  The 
Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower court’s ruling.131  The Court 
declared that “[w]e are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such 
restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.  
Whether, and to what extent . . . such activity shall be adjudged a 
derogation of the public right of user, are matters for legislative 
judgment.”132   
Valentine sets the scene for our discussion of regulating advertising to 
children.  After Valentine, any regulation on commercial speech protecting 
the nation’s children would have been permitted by the Constitution 
because the Court had ruled it was within the legislature’s judgment to 
decide to enact such laws.133  However, changes in the commercial speech 
doctrine through subsequent Supreme Court cases prove it is much more 
difficult to create regulations on commercial speech today than 
immediately following the Valentine ruling. 
B.  Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on  
Human Relations (1973) 
Despite the ruling in Valentine, the constitutionality of regulating 
vestibule or any hall of any building, or in a letterbox therein; provided that 
nothing herein contained shall be deemed to prohibit or otherwise regulate the 
delivery of any such matter by the United States postal service, or prohibit the 
distribution of sample copies of newspapers regularly sold by the copy or by 
annual subscription.  This section is not intended to prevent the lawful 
distribution of anything other than commercial and business advertising 
matter.   
53 n.1 (quId. at oting New York Sanitary Code § 318). 
4. 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1964); Breard v. 
 128. Id. at 53. 
 129. Id. at 53–5
 130. Id. at 54. 
 131. Id. at 55. 
 132. Id. at 54. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See N.Y. 
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discriminatory messages.  Second, Pittsburgh Press Co. teaches us that 
in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, the 
Court reexamined the issue of commercial speech, this time concerning a 
violation of a ban of sexual discrimination.135  Specifically, the Pittsburgh 
Commission on Human Relations determined that the Pittsburgh Press 
violated a city ordinance by placing help-wanted advertisements classified 
by gender in columns labeled “Male Interest,” “Female Interest,” and 
“Male-Female.”136  Pittsburgh Press contended that the ordinance 
prohibited the newspaper from exercising its constitutional rights to 
freedom of the press.137  The Court upheld the commission’s ban on 
sexually discriminatory advertising, comparing the illegality of sexual 
employment discrimination in jobs-wanted advertisements to the idea that 
a newspaper can constitutionally be forbidden to publish a want-ad 
proposing narcotics or prostitutes.138  It is important to note that the Court 
focused primarily on advertising for illegal activities while acknowledging 
there might be another context in which commercial speech139 could 
receive greater protection.140  The Court concluded that advertisements for 
illegal activities do not fall under First Amendment protection.141  Those in 
favor of regulating advertising to children can learn two lessons from 
Pittsburgh Press Co.  First, it can be helpful to couch arguments in favor of 
regulation of commercials using the idea of nondiscrimination.  That is, the 
Court found the newspaper’s advertisements discriminating against men 
and women to be illegal and not warranting constitutional protection.142  If 
proponents of regulation can amass evidence indicating commercials are 
discriminatory against minorities and women, perhaps there is an argument 
to be made in favor of regulating an advertiser’s ability to send such 
 
City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 625 (1951). 
 135. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 
U.S. 376, 378–79 (1973). 
 136. Id. at 379–80. 
 137. Id. at 380–81. 
 138. Id. at 388, 391. 
 139. Id. at 384, 385 (stating “speech is not rendered commercial by the mere 
fact that it relates to an advertisement”).  Instead, the Court defined commercial 
speech as an expression that “did no more than propose a commercial transaction.”  Id. 
at 385. 
 140. Id. at 388–89. 
 141. See id. at 388, 391 (“We hold only that the Commission’s modified order, 
narrowly drawn to prohibit placement in sex-designated columns of advertisements for 
nonexempt job opportunities, does not infringe the First Amendment rights of 
Pittsburgh Press.”). 
 142. See id. 
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C.  Bigelow v. Virginia (1975) 
Decades after its , the Court began to 
turn away from its p ecedent.144  Whereas 
Pittsb
u to create laws regulating 
 
advertisements for illegal activities are not protected by the First 
Amendment.143  Thus, perhaps a future avenue for increased regulation of 
advertisements would be stricter FTC enforcement of such unlawful 
advertisements. 
 foundational ruling in Valentine
revious commercial speech pr
urgh Press Co. ruled on the amount of constitutional protection for 
illegal speech,145 two years later in Bigelow v. Virginia the Court clarified 
the protection of commercial speech advertising for some legal activities.146  
The managing editor of a weekly newspaper circulated at the University of 
Virginia—in a state where abortions were illegal—was convicted of a 
misdemeanor147 as the result of publishing a New York City organization’s 
advertisement explaining the availability of abortions for young women if 
they traveled to New York—where abortions were legal and there was no 
residency requirement.148  The state supreme court ruled in accordance 
with prior Supreme Court commercial speech precedent, asserting that 
because the abortion advertisements were commercial speech, the 
advertisements were subject to unrestrained governmental regulation.149  
However, the Supreme Court reversed that ruling and granted some First 
Amendment protection to legal commercial speech.150  Furthermore, the 
Court described its ruling in Valentine as “distinctly a limited one” that 
merely upheld “a reasonable regulation of the manner in which 
commercial advertising could be distributed.”151   
In Bigelow, we see a shift in the Court’s consideration of commercial 
speech protection, thus making it more diffic lt 
 143. See id. at 388. 
 144. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 819–22 (1975) (citing and narrowly 
interpreting the holdings of several cases, from Valentine to Pittsburgh Press Co.). 
 145. Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 391. 
 146. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 825–26. 
 147. The statute at that time read, “‘[i]f any person, by publication, lecture, 
advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or in any other manner, 
encourage or prompt the procuring of abortion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor.’”  Id. at 812–13 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1960)). 
 148. Id. at 812–14. 
 149. Id. at 814–15. 
 150. Id. at 825–29.    
 151. Id. at 819. 
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Council, Inc. (1976) 
e 
Court again considered the nal protection that should 
be g
rtising to children.  The opinion gave greater First Amendment rights 
to advertisers while lessening the Court’s acquiescence to the legislature’s 
control over commercial speech established in Valentine.152  Despite 
providing more protection for commercial speech, however, Bigelow did 
not prohibit all regulations on commercial speech or advertising.153 
D.  Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consu
Relying and expounding on Bigelow, one year later the Suprem
 amount of constitutio
iven to commercial advertisements.154  In Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., a prescription drug 
user and two nonprofit organizations whose members were prescription 
drug users challenged, on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds, a 
Virginia statute prohibiting pharmacists in Virginia from advertising prices 
for prescription drugs.155  The district court decided that the statute 
violated consumers’ First Amendment rights and was not adequately 
justified.156  On direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed.157  Relying on 
Bigelow, the Court determined that purely economic speech is not 
disqualified from protection under the First Amendment.158  The Court 
further declared that society has “a strong interest in the free flow of 
commercial information” and that “[e]ven an individual advertisement, 
though entirely ‘commercial,’ may be of general public interest.”159  
Therefore, in a landmark decision, the Supreme Court held that 
commercial speech regarding legal activities, even if it pertains to economic 
interests, is entitled to some First Amendment protection.160  Furthermore, 
 
 152. See id. at 819, 825–26. 
 153. See id. at 826. 
te Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
1976). 
 
.  International law has since refuted the Court’s decision.  
d States Supreme Court Cases in the Court of Justice of the 
 154. See generally Va. Sta
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (
 155. Id. at 749–50, 753. 
 156. Id. at 755–56. 
 157. Id. at 773. 
 158. Id. at 760. 
 159. Id. at 764.  
 160. Id. at 771–73
See Peter Herzog, Unite
European Communities, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 903, 907–08 (1998) 
(explaining that the Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy was 
not persuasive to the Court of Justice, which held that de minimus advertising 
restrictions, such as in France, cannot be prohibited).  Herzog wrote, “[t]hus, the 
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 commercial expression.161  
disciplinary rule.166  The appellants then sought review in the Supreme 
Court of Arizona, arguing that the disciplinary “rule infringed their First 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy established an intermediate level of First 
Amendment protection for
The intermediate level of First Amendment protection for 
commercial speech is important to consider when framing regulations for 
advertising to children.  Regulations for commercials directed at children 
therefore are neither fully protected nor prohibited by the Court.162  
Understanding the First Amendment as a continuum allowing varying 
degrees of regulation can give hope from past failures to regulate 
commercial speech.  For example, if a court strikes down a regulation in 
favor of more First Amendment protection, that does not necessarily mean 
all future regulations governing advertising to children are necessarily 
unconstitutional.163  Many child advocates are easily upset at the failure of 
past regulations; however, they must keep in mind that regulations of 
commercial speech exist but are not absolute. 
E.  Bates v. State Bar of Arizona (1977) 
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Court considered the limits of 
false or misleading commercial speech pertaining to legal advertising.164  
Despite an Arizona disciplinary rule prohibiting lawyers from publicizing 
themselves by commercial means, two attorneys placed an advertisement in 
a Phoenix newspaper stating that they “were offering ‘legal services at very 
reasonable fees,’” and listing their fees.165  As a result, the State Bar 
intervened and imposed penalties on the attorneys for violating the state 
 
reference to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy 
did not seem to persuade the Court of Justice of the importance of completely free 
advertising for the untrammeled flow of trade in a common market.”  Id. at 908. 
 161. See Arlen W. Langvardt, The Incremental Strengthening of First 
s v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
Amendment Protection for Commercial Speech:  Lessons from Greater New Orleans 
Broadcasting, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 587, 588 (2000) (explaining that the intermediate level 
of First Amendment protection “exists somewhere between the ‘full’ First Amendment 
protection extended to most noncommercial expression and the complete absence of 
First Amendment protection for certain other speech, such as obscenity.  Over the past 
quarter-century, the level of First Amendment protection extended to commercial 
speech has continued to be intermediate in nature.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 162. See infra Part V. 
 163. See infra Part V. 
 164. See generally Bate
 165. Id. at 354. 
 166. Id. at 356. 
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F.  FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (1978) 
The pivotal ercial speech and 
First Amendment rectly involve the 
prote
Amendment rights.”167  The court rejected the First Amendment claims.168  
However, the United State Supreme Court reversed and declared that 
Arizona’s disciplinary rule violated the First Amendment—a decision 
flowing from Virginia State Board of Pharmacy.169  The Court rejected the 
Arizona State Bar’s argument that advertising of legal services is inevitably 
misleading “because such services are so individualized with regard to 
content and quality . . . [and] . . . because the consumer of legal services is 
unable to determine in advance just what services he needs.”170  Rather, the 
Court held that false, deceptive, or misleading advertising is subject to 
restraint.171  The “leeway for untruthful or misleading expression that has 
been allowed in other contexts has little force in the commercial speech 
arena.”172  The Court’s ruling in Bates provides a foundational argument 
for the increased regulation of advertising to children.  That is, if 
advertisements to children are inherently deceptive or misleading, 
according to Bates, they could be subject to regulation.173  Therefore, Bates 
provides legal justification for protecting children from deceptive 
advertising. 
Supreme Court cases regarding comm
 protection discussed above did not di
ction of children.  However, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court 
specifically addressed the issue of commercial advertising affecting 
children.174  The case arose on a weekday afternoon at around two o’clock 
when a radio station aired a twelve minute monologue given by humorist 
George Carlin entitled “Filthy Words.”175  In the program, Carlin related 
his thoughts about words you could not say on the public airwaves and 
repeated, several times, a number of colloquial expressions for sexual and 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 367–72 (analyzing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy as the starting 
point for determining whether Arizona’s ban on attorney advertising could pass 
constitutional muster). 
 170. Id. at 372. 
 171. Id. at 383 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771–72 (1976)). 
 172. Id. 
 173. See infra Part V. 
 174. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 175. Id. at 729. 
Browne 7.0  12/10/2009  3:11 PM 
2009] Advertising to Children  95 
 
s he Court 
estab
 
excretory activities and organs.176  A man complained to the FCC after his 
child heard the broadcast.177  The FCC responded by issuing an order 
saying that the radio station owner could be subject to administrative 
sanction because the broadcast aired during a time of day when children 
were likely to be in the audience and the broadcast contained what the 
FCC deemed to be indecent language.178  The court of appeals ruled the 
FCC’s action was overly broad and constituted censorship179 in violation of, 
and beyond the power granted by, the United States Code.180  However, 
the Supreme Court reversed.181  The rationale for the Court’s decision 
included the belief that of all forms of communication, broadcasting has 
“the most limited First Amendment protection.”182  Specifically, 
broadcasting intrudes into “the privacy of the home” and furthermore is 
“uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read.”183  
Therefore, the Court held protecting children from offensive expression 
through special treatment of indecent broadcasting is justified.184   
The Court’s ruling in Pacifica is paramount to the argument for 
increased regulation of advertising to children.  In other word , t
lished that all ears, particularly those of the youth of America, are not 
prepared to hear otherwise protected speech.185  With age comes 
understanding, and, due to children’s lack of understanding, it is 
manipulative and coercive to subject children to the same speech adults 
hear on a regular basis.  Unregulated commercial speech allows advertisers 
to infiltrate the home and prey on the captive audience of children, which 
is similar to what the Court found impermissible in Pacifica.186  Thus, 
commercial speech is not black and white.  Rather, the Court considers 
commercial speech from all perspectives, including the perspective of the 
most innocent Americans—children.  The Court’s ruling in Pacifica 
 176. Id. at 732. 
 177. Id. at 730. 
 178. Id. at 730, 732. 
 179. Id. at 733. 
 180. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006) (prohibiting the broadcast of “obscene, 
indecent, or profane language”); 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2006) (“Nothing in this chapter shall 
be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over 
radio. . . .”). 
 181. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 751. 
 182. Id. at 748. 
 183. Id. at 748–49. 
 184. Id. at 749–50. 
 185. Id. at 749. 
 186. See id. at 750. 
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as & Electric Corp. v. Public  
Service Commission (1980) 
In Cen ourt cases 
regarding commercial  Gas and Electric 
Corp
  To pass this first prong, the speech 
“mus
provides the underlying assumptions needed to argue for increased 
regulation of advertising to children.  If we believe children are a unique 
and naïve audience, as the Court did, it follows that increased regulation 
for their protection is necessary. 
G.  Central Hudson G
tral Hudson l Supreme C, one of the most influentia
 speech, Central Hudson
oration challenged New York’s ban on advertising for utilities.187  The 
ban originated during a fuel shortage and required every electric utility in 
the state to cease all advertising promoting electricity use because the 
state’s utility system did not have enough fuel to meet demand.188  Three 
years later, when the fuel shortage eased but the ban continued, Central 
Hudson challenged the ban, claiming restraint of commercial speech in 
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.189  The Court of 
Appeals of New York upheld the prohibition on advertising, determining 
that “governmental interest in the prohibition outweighed the limited 
constitutional value of the commercial” advertisements.190  However, the 
Supreme Court reversed the decision.191  In its ruling, the Court established 
a four-part test for future courts to use when analyzing government 
restrictions on commercial speech.192 
From the outset, courts must determine whether the speech “is 
protected by the First Amendment.”193
t concern lawful activity and [must] not be misleading.”194  The second 
prong requires the government to have a substantial interest in regulating a 
particular activity.195  If the speech passes the first two prongs, the third 
prong questions whether the regulation advances the government’s 
substantial interest.196  The fourth prong asks whether the particular 
 
 187. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 560 
Id. at 559. 
t 561. 
id. at 566. 
(1980). 
 188. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. a
 191. Id. 
 192. See 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
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onent to any proposed regulation 
regar
Court reversed and remanded the case, finding that “protecting the 
regulation is the least restrictive means of advancing the government’s 
interest and whether the regulation is narrowly tailored.197  If the speech 
passes all four prongs, it is protected by the First Amendment.198  In 
Central Hudson, the Court determined the ban was more extensive than 
necessary, and therefore struck it down as unlawful.199 
Central Hudson is an essential comp
ding advertising to children.  That is, the Court’s ruling regarding 
commercial speech regulations necessarily includes laws regarding the 
protection of children.  Therefore, when crafting public policy for 
advertising, lawmakers must keep the Central Hudson test in mind and 
cannot be overzealous in issuing regulations.  The four prongs of the 
Central Hudson test are the parameters in which all regulations on 
advertising to children must fit.200  If any of the prongs are not satisfied 
with respect to a regulation, that regulation would therefore be 
unconstitutional.  
H.  New York v. Ferber (1982) 
New York v. Ferber is another Supreme Court case favoring the 
protection of children over commercial speech rights.201  An adult 
bookstore owner was convicted under a New York statute for selling films 
depicting young boys masturbating.202  As a result, Ferber was convicted on 
two counts of promoting sexual performances by children in violation of a 
New York statute.203  The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding 
that the statute violated Ferber’s First Amendment rights.204  The Supreme 
 
 197. Id. 
 198. See generally Arlen W. Langvardt & Eric L. Richards, The Death of 
Posadas and the Birth of Change in Commercial Speech Doctrine:  Implications of 44 
Liquormart, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 483, 489–90 (1997) (explaining that the test was not 
received enthusiastically on a universal level and noting that opponents of the four 
prongs saw the test as too subjective for the courts to yield consistent results when 
applying). 
 199. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561. 
 200. See infra Part V (demonstrating the application of the Central Hudson test 
to hypothetical regulations restricting advertising to children and hypothesizing that if 
the regulations could not pass the four prongs of Central Hudson, increased regulation 
would have no legal support). 
 201. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
 202. Id. at 752. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
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 cision in Ferber provides a strong justification 
for in




physical and emotional well-being of youth” is important “even when the 
laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected 
rights.”205  Furthermore, the Court declared that “the care of children is a 
sacred trust and should not be abused by those who seek to profit through 
a commercial network.”206 
Again, the Court’s de
creased regulation of advertising to children.  Paired with Pacifica, 
the Court’s decision further explains the sacredness of the youngest 
generation of citizens.  Ferber shows that the Court’s previous ruling in 
Pacifica was not merely a fluke or afterthought; rather, the Court considers 
the protection of children a vital component of its jurisprudence.  The 
Court’s stance on the protection of children cannot be taken lightly, and 
thus every subsequent case regarding the protection of children adds 
ammunition to the arsenal for further television regulation.  Although the 
United States may not have laws on advertising to children as strict as 
those of many other industrialized democracies,207 Pacifica and Ferber, 
along with subsequent Court rulings,208 prove that the protection of 
children is not outside the scope of the United States’ interest. 
llowing the creation of the four-prong analysis in Central H
upreme Court applied the test to subsequent commercial speech 
cases, suggesting that the test has predominance in determining the 
constitutionality of commercial speech.  One of the first major cases to use 
the test was Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of 
Puerto Rico.209  Under a statute of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
casino gambling and advertising to tourists was legal, but no casino was 
authorized to advertise to residents of the commonwealth.210  A hotel with 
 205. Id. at 757. 
 omitted). 
scussing the regulations other nations place on 
ee, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849, 879 (1997) (acknowledging 
 206. Id. (citation
 207. See infra Part VI (di
advertising). 
 208. S
that restrictions on Internet interactions with children advanced the state interest of 
protecting children, but noting that in this case, the regulations were not narrowly 
tailored).  The Court also acknowledged children are more at risk when it comes to 
television than the Internet because an individual can choose not to enter a website, 
but often television advertisements intrude upon the home undesirably.  Id. at 854. 
 209. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986). 
 210. Id. at 331–32. 
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n analysis of 
Centr
a casino was fined several times for not following the statute, and finally 
filed suit against the tourism company that enforced the statute.211  The 
hotel asserted that the casino advertising statute “suppressed commercial 
speech in violation of the First Amendment, Equal Protection, and Due 
Process guaranties of the United States Constitution.”212  The Supreme 
Court of Puerto Rico upheld the statute, claiming that the limitations on 
advertising to residents and not tourists were constitutional.213   
On appeal, the Supreme Court applied the four-pro g 
al Hudson and determined that the statute passed all four parts of the 
test, thus affirming the ruling of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.214  It 
was undisputed that the commercial speech at issue—advertising of casino 
gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico—concerned lawful activity 
and was not fraudulent or misleading.215  Second, the substantial 
government interest behind the regulation, “as determined by the Superior 
Court [was] the reduction of demand for casino gambling by the residents 
of Puerto Rico.”216  Also, the Court agreed that gambling had strong 
connections with criminal activity, further indicating a sufficient 
governmental interest in protecting the health and welfare of its citizens.217  
Third, the Court affirmed the Puerto Rico Legislature’s belief that 
advertising of casino gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico would 
serve to increase the demand for the product advertised, thus passing the 
third prong of Central Hudson.218  To fulfill the fourth prong, the Court 
concluded that the challenged statute and regulations were no more 
extensive than necessary to serve the government’s interest.219  
 
 211. Id. at 333–34. 
 212. Id. at 331. 
1. 
e the Supreme Court’s yielding of power to the Legislative and 
es in Posadas, the Court emphasized the importance of passing the 
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993).  In 
 213. See id. at 338. 
 214. Id. at 344. 
 215. Id. at 340–4
 216. Id. at 341. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 343. 
 219. Id.  Despit
Executive branch
Central Hudson test in 
that case, the City of Cincinnati, motivated by a desire for an attractive appearance of 
its streets, banned the distribution of commercial flyers through news racks on public 
property.  Id. at 412.  The Supreme Court declared the ban to be in violation of the 
First Amendment.  Id.  The rationale for the Court’s ruling was the city’s failure to pass 
the fourth part of the Central Hudson test.  See id. at 428.  The fact that the city failed 
to address its concern about news racks by regulating their size, shape, appearance, or 
number indicated it did not carefully calculate the regulation.  Id. at 417.  Because the 
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due to questions surrounding the fourth prong of the Central Hudson 
test—that is, whether the state’s regulations were the least restrictive 
Additionally, the Court reasoned that the power a government has to 
“completely regulate casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power 
to ban the advertising of casino gambling.”220  
Ultimately, the long-term effect of Posadas was to weaken the 
commercial speech doctrine by affording deference to the states.221  In 
doing so, the Court granted greater leeway to state governments for the 
regulation of advertising to children.  If the State has the right to regulate 
the education and domestic well-being of children, it follows that the state 
also has the lesser right to regulate the intrusion of child marketers into the 
privacy of the home.  Thus, Posadas strengthens the argument for 
increased regulation of advertising directed at our youth. 
J.  Board of Trustees v. Fox (1989) 
Another important application of the four-part test established by 
Central Hudson was the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Trustees of 
the State University of New York v. Fox.222  The University of New York 
established regulations governing the use of school property and 
dormitories, which banned private commercial enterprises from operating 
on campus.223  In October 1982, a sales representative for kitchenware was 
conducting a products demonstration when campus police asked her to 
leave.224  After she refused, the police arrested the representative, who 
then sued based on the claim that the University’s ban violated her First 
Amendment rights.225  The district court held that the speech regulations 
were constitutional.226  On appeal, the case was reversed and remanded 
 
ban on distributing commercial handbills in news racks did not seem to reasonably fit 
the city’s goal for the aesthetics of the area, and because there was a lack of evidence to 
support such a stance, the Supreme Court declared the ban unconstitutional.  Id. at 
430–31.  With the ruling, the Court thus strengthened the Central Hudson test, 
subsequently making it more difficult to regulate commercial speech and advertising to 
children. 
 220. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 346. 
 221. See Joshua A. Marcus, Note, Commercial Speech on the Internet:  Spam 
and the First Amendment, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 245, 266–67 (1998). 
 222. See Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475 (1989). 
 223. Id. at 471–72. 
 224. Id. at 472. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
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 ourt granted 
more
K.  United States v. Playboy (2000) 
In 2000, the question of how courts should balance the government 
inter
 
regulation.227  However, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the 
case yet again, thus lessening the restrictive nature of the fourth prong of 
Central Hudson in favor of more regulation for commercial speech.228  By 
declining to impose a least-restrictive-means requirement, the Supreme 
Court took into account the difficulty of establishing “the point when 
restrictions become more extensive than their objective requires.”229  As 
such, Fox provided the legislative and executive branches with latitude in 
the field of commercial speech regulation and diminished the strict 
interpretation of the commercial speech doctrine established in Central 
Hudson.230 
Fox gave hope to advocates of regulation because the C
 power to legislatures to enact laws regarding commercial speech.  
Logically, if we apply the Court’s reasoning to the regulation of advertising 
to children, it follows that regulations will pass the Central Hudson test 
more easily if they are subject to less scrutiny.  However, as Part VII of this 
Article explains, Fox was short-lived, and now the courts require a more 
strict interpretation of Central Hudson. Therefore, after Fox, regulating 
advertising to children may have been easier; however, it is unclear 
whether that ease still exists today. 
est of protecting children against First Amendment rights again was 
raised.231  The Communications Decency Act (CDA), as discussed in Reno 
v. ACLU,232 was again under scrutiny in United States v. Playboy.233 The 
phenomenon of “signal bleed” occurs when a program not in a resident’s 
cable package can be heard or seen despite the cable company’s blockage 
 227. Id. at 472–73. 
 228. Id. at 479–81 (stating that the Court has “not gone so far as to impose 
upon [regulators] the burden of demonstrating that . . . the manner of restriction is 
absolutely the least severe that will achieve the desired end”). 
 229. Id. at 480–81. 
 230. See id. at 481 (stating the Court was providing the Legislative and 
Executive branches the “needed leeway in a field (commercial speech) ‘traditionally 
subject to governmental regulation’”) (citation omitted). 
 231. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 806–07 (2000). 
 232. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. 
I) (holding that the “statute abridges ‘the freedom of speech’ protected by the First 
Amendment”). 
 233. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. at 806.   
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of a channel.234  The CDA required cable television providers to only 
transmit channels with sexually explicit adult programming between 10 
p.m. and 6 a.m. or to fully block those channels, even during the eight-hour 
period at night when children would be unlikely to see the signal bleed.235  
Playboy Entertainment Group filed suit, claiming First Amendment 
violations because the statute was “unnecessarily restrictive content-based 
legislation.”236  Despite acknowledging the compelling government interest 
of protecting children, the district court ruled that the regulations were too 
restrictive in nature and therefore unconstitutional.237  Similarly, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the decision, once again declaring that the 
regulations were not the least restrictive method available to protect 
children.238  Because the regulations were not sufficiently narrowly 
tailored, the restriction of speech was not adequately justified and 
therefore was not permitted by the Firs
The implications of Playboy are great for our consideration of 
advertising to children.  Most importantly, the Court reestablished in the 
twenty-first century the idea that the United States government has a 
substantial interest in protecting children.  Although the Court often cites 
the state interest of the safety of children, Court rulings do not always 
remain static.  However, through the history of the commercial speech 
doctrine, it is clear that the Court considers the protection of children to be 
a high and unwavering priority.240  The Court’s recent rulings seem to 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 807. 
 237. Id. at 809–10. 
 238. Id. at 827.  The Central Hudson test was not applied to the speech 
regulations because the regulation was a content-based speech restriction and could 
stand only if it satisfied strict scrutiny, which both the district and Supreme Court 
applied.  Id. at 813.  This case required the least restrictive means for regulations, 
whereas the intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson requires only a proper fit 
between the means and the end. 
 239. Id. 
 240. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (holding that the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996—regulating transmission of indecent 
communications using telecommunications devices—could be constitutionally valid if 
modified slightly); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (holding child 
pornography will not receive First Amendment protection as long as conduct is 
sufficiently defined by state law); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747, 749 (1978) 
(upholding FCC decision that radio broadcast of George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” 
monologue was indecent and prohibited in part because it was uniquely accessible to 
children). 
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indicate that protecting children is here to stay.  Thus, the current legal 
atmosphere in the United States is ripe for further regulation of advertising 
when such advertising is specifically directed at children.  However, an 
important lesson that child advocates can learn from the Court’s decision in 
Playboy is the essentiality of narrowly tailoring all regulations on 
commercial speech.  Protecting children may be important, but recognizing 
that adults have the necessity of information in advertisements will be 
paramount to the specific tailoring of any child advertising regulation.  
L.  Summary 
The Court has been divided through the decades on the question of 
how much constitutional protection to grant commercial speech.  Despite 
the Court’s creation of the Central Hudson framework in 1980, the Court 
has subsequently applied the four-prong test in a variety of ways.241  What 
remains clear is that the Court has consistently ruled that the government 
has a substantial interest in protecting the safety and well-being of its 
citizens, so long as the regulations conform to the Central Hudson test.  
Overall, case law has attempted to handle advertising to children in a very 
selective way.  Most cases do not directly attack questions about the legal 
 241. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (reflecting the 
Court’s ruling for greater protection for commercial speech).  Upon the Supreme 
Court’s application of the Central Hudson test, the regulations desired in Lorillard did 
not stand.  Id. at 554.  The third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson were not 
satisfied.  Id. at 566.  Specifically, the state failed to provide conclusive evidence for 
how regulations advanced the state interest.  Id.  The regulations also failed the fourth 
prong because they were not narrowly tailored.  Id.  Therefore, when considering 
advertising to children, it is imperative that all regulations be adequately justified with 
evidence and are narrowly tailored to advance the state interest of protecting children.  
See also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).  In 44 Liquormart, 
the Court ruled that the regulation of commercial speech in question failed the third 
and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test.  Specifically, although Rhode Island 
believed the statute furthered the state interest of reducing alcohol consumption, the 
state provided no empirical evidence suggesting advertising prices of alcohol (the issue 
at hand in the case) would lead to significantly greater alcohol consumption.  Id. at 
506–07.  Furthermore, the Rhode Island regulation was not the least restrictive means 
to support temperance, so it was not narrowly tailored.  Id. at 507–08.  Therefore, the 
Supreme Court declared Rhode Island’s regulations unconstitutional after failing the 
Central Hudson test.  Id. at 508.  See also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 173, 188–90 (1999) (concluding the laws limiting advertisement of 
casinos failed the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test).  Although there 
was a state interest in reducing the amount of gambling by citizens, no substantial 
evidence was given that the regulations advanced the state interest.  44 Liquormart 
Inc., 517 U.S. at 507–08. 
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nature of this advertising, but rather address specific, pointed questions 
regarding specific regulations.  There have been, and are, powerful 
interests involved on both sides of this debate.  Industry giants and special 
interest groups are all putting up a significant fight and at this point in time, 
no side has been declared a clear winner.  
As the Supreme Court continually professes the importance of 
protecting children, perhaps United States public policy will soon coalesce 
with the values expressed by the Justices.  The Court’s rulings in cases 
balancing the protection of children against commercial speech give hope 
that one day soon the United States will follow the lead of Canada and the 
European nations that protect the innocence of children.  However, as the 
following section demonstrates, governmental agencies and the legislative 
branch have been unsuccessful and unwilling in past attempts to protect 
America’s youth. 
V.  TAKING THE TEST:  CHILD ADVERTISING REGULATIONS UNDER 
CENTRAL HUDSON 
The Central Hudson test is the analysis that determines whether the 
government may constitutionally ban certain types or forms of 
advertising.242  In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court established a four-
prong test for evaluating whether a governmental regulation over 
commercial speech is protected.243  By applying the four-part test to 
hypothetical regulations of advertising to children, we can predict whether 
further protection of children through advertising restrictions will be held 
to be constitutionally protected. 
First, the Central Hudson test is applicable only to regulations that 
pertain to communication that is neither misleading nor unlawful—
commercial speech that is misleading or unlawful is not protected by the 
First Amendment, and thus the Central Hudson test does not apply to such 
speech.244  Without dispute, the sale of consumer goods, toys, food, and 
services to children is legal. While certain products or commercials may be 
deemed inappropriate for children, they are not illegal.   
 242. Despite disagreement among some Supreme Court Justices about 
applying the test in 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 517–18, the Central Hudson test is still 
widely used when determining whether a governmental regulation on commercial 
speech is constitutional.   
 243. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
 244. Id. at 566. 
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While this first prong of the test is the least litigated, there is a 
growing push for the court to reevaluate its assumption that the 
advertisements are not themselves misleading, especially when they are 
focused on more vulnerable audiences, such as children.  “If Congress were 
to pass [] proposed legislation based on its conclusion that product 
placement and celebrity spokes-character marketing in children’s media 
were misleading or deceptive, the Supreme Court would likely uphold the 
restrictions under the first prong of the Central Hudson test.”245  The 
Court’s basic assumption in its evaluation of what is “misleading”—that 
children are similar to adults—is flawed, and requires a more thorough and 
complete exploration.  
Second, the state must demonstrate a substantial interest.246  
Furthermore, the substantial state interest cited must be justified through 
substantial evidence.247  Regulations on advertising to children satisfy the 
 245. Angela J. Campbell, Restricting the Marketing of Junk Food to Children 
by Product Placement and Character Selling, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 447, 492 (2006). 
 246. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.  See also Langvardt, supra note 161, at 600 
(explaining the ease at which the government has been able to establish the second 
prong of Central Hudson).  Langvardt explains that the government has been able to 
easily establish this second prong by citing a number of cases:  Greater New Orleans 
Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 186 (1999) (showing a “substantial 
government interest in reducing social ills associated with gambling”); 44 Liquormart, 
Inc., 517 U.S. at 504 (finding a “substantial government interest in reducing public’s 
consumption of alcoholic beverages”); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 
(1995) (holding there is a “substantial government interest in guarding against ‘strength 
wars’ among producers of alcoholic beverages”); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 
U.S. 418, 423, 426, 428 (1993) (finding “substantial government interest in 
accommodating competing public policies of lottery and non-lottery states”); Edenfield 
v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768–69 (1993) (finding a “substantial government interest in 
protecting public against fraud by certified public accountants”); City of Cincinnati v. 
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 414, 416–18 (1993) (finding a “substantial 
government interests in enhancing safety on, and aesthetics of, public property”); Bd. 
of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475 (1989) (finding substantial 
government interests in promoting sound educational environment at a state university 
and in protecting students against manipulative sellers of products); Posadas de P.R. 
Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986) (finding a “substantial government 
interest in reducing demand for casino gambling and thereby minimizing related social 
ills”); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71–75 (1983) (finding a 
“substantial government interest in helping parents maintain control over when and 
how to expose their children to sensitive subjects”); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568–69 
(finding “substantial government interests in promoting energy conservation and in 
attempting to ensure that utility rates are fair”).  Id. at 600 n.90. 
 247. See generally O. Lee Reed, Is Commercial Speech Really Less Valuable 
Than Political Speech?  On Replacing Values and Categories in First Amendment 
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second prong of Central Hudson because the government has a well-
established and compelling interest in protecting children, recognized by 
the Court in the aforementioned case law.  Generally, courts have 
recognized two compelling government interests in regards to children. 
First, the government has an interest in assisting parents in the supervision 
and rearing of their children.248  Second, the government has an interest in 
shielding minors from physical and psychological abuse.249  Furthermore, a 
House of Representatives bill indicates that “it is difficult to think of an 
interest more substantial than the promotion of the welfare of children.”250  
Thus, the government can advance interests to be served by regulating 
advertising to children sufficiently to satisfy the second part of the Central 
Hudson test.251  
Jurisprudence, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 31 (1996) (discussing the Supreme Court’s increased 
concern with providing evidence for commercial speech to be restricted).   
 248. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (upholding regulation of 
material that was obscene for children but not for adults and stating that it is proper for 
the state to enact laws to help parents protect their children’s well-being). 
 249. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 755 (1982) (quoting Globe Newspaper 
Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)). 
 250. H.R. REP. NO. 101-385, at 11 (1991), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1605, 
1616. 
 251. See Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (providing an 
example of the proper evidence and justification needed to pass the second prong of 
Central Hudson).  The Supreme Court applied the Central Hudson test to a Florida Bar 
Association ban on personal injury lawyers sending direct-mail advertisements to 
victims and their relatives for thirty days following an accident.  See id. at 620, 623.  
John Blakely and a lawyer referral service that often distributed such advertisements 
filed suit claiming First Amendment infringement.  Id. at 621.  The first prong was not 
disputed because sending direct-mail advertisements was neither unlawful nor 
misleading.  Id. at 623–24.  For the second prong, the Supreme Court ruled the Bar had 
a substantial interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims 
and their loved ones and this substantial interest was well within the police powers of 
the state.  Id. at 625.  In support of its argument that its interest was substantial, the Bar 
submitted a 106-page summary of its two-year study of lawyer advertising, which 
contained both statistical and anecdotal data about the public views of soliciting 
families in the wake of an accident.  Id. at 626.  Twenty-seven percent of recipients of 
direct-mail advertising reported their regard for the legal profession as a whole was 
lowered as a result of receiving the direct mail.  Id. at 627.  In the end, the regulation 
passed all four prongs of Central Hudson and the Court upheld the regulation as 
constitutional.  Id. at 635.  However, without all of the detailed material evidence used 
to prove the second prong of Central Hudson, it is questionable whether the 
regulations would have passed.  That is why in the debate over advertising to children, 
statistical and anecdotal evidence regarding the effects of advertising to children is 
necessary to demonstrate that the state has an interest in the protection of children. 
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Despite the ease of fulfilling the first two prongs of the Central 
Hudson test, the most difficult constitutional hurdles arise when such 
regulations are examined under the third and fourth prongs.  The third 
prong requires the government to show that the restrictions directly 
advance the government’s substantial interest.252  In recent years, the Court 
has applied stricter scrutiny of regulation and required more firm evidence 
than in previous applications of Central Hudson.253  For instance, the Court 
struck down restrictions in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island and Greater 
New Orleans Broadcasting Association v. United States partly because the 
Court was not convinced that limiting such advertising actually reduced 
consumption of the underlying products.254  However, in the case of 
restrictions on advertising to children, hypothetical regulations appear to 
pass the third prong.  For instance, a regulation limiting the amount of 
commercial time during programs aimed at children would substantially 
reduce the amount of commercial material viewed by children, thus 
furthering the government’s interests to a material degree.  The data 
indicates that children watch more television on weekdays than on 
 252. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980). 
 253. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505–08 (1996) 
(stating that the Court was unable to find that a price advertising ban significantly 
advanced the State’s interest without evidentiary support).  Daniel E. Troy observed 
that in 44 Liquormart, “even those Justices explicitly relying on the four-factored 
Central Hudson test appeared to apply stricter scrutiny . . . in the case than the Central 
Hudson test often requires.”  Daniel E. Troy, Advertising:  Not “Low Value” Speech, 
16 YALE J. ON REG. 85, 140 (1999); see also Michael Hoefges & Milagros Rivera-
Sanchez, “Vice” Advertising Under the Supreme Court’s Commercial Speech Doctrine:  
The Shifting Central Hudson Analysis, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 345, 372 (2001) 
(noting that the Court significantly tightened the third and fourth factors of the Central 
Hudson test in 44 Liquormart and other cases that followed); Sean P. Costello,  
Comment, Strange Brew:  The State of Commercial Speech Jurisprudence Before and 
After 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 681, 748 (1997) 
(“[I]t appears that the Court is now inclined to place commercial speech closer to the 
core of protected speech in some circumstances.”). 
 254. Greater New Orleans Broad. Assoc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 176, 
189 (1999); 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 505–07.  Other writers have observed the 
Court moving toward a more stringent application of the commercial speech tests by 
requiring proof of the third part of the Central Hudson test.  See William D. O’Neill, 
Governmental Restrictions on Beverage Alcohol Advertising After 44 Liquormart v. 
Rhode Island, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 267, 279–82 (1998); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap 
Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech:  The Implications of 44 Liquormart, SUP. CT. REV. 
123, 124, 138–45 (1996); Marrie K. Stone, Note, The Price Isn’t Right:  44 Liquormart 
Inc. v. Rhode Island Promotes Free Speech in Commercial Advertising, 18 LOY. L.A. 
ENT. L. REV. 133, 152–53 (1997). 
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weekends,255 so a hypothetical regulation could require fewer commercials 
during weekday programming than on the weekends.  This too would 
reduce the number of commercials that children view during children’s 
programming, thus advancing the government’s interest of protecting 
children.  When considering whether regulations for advertising directed at 
children should be permitted under the third prong, it is appropriate to 
question the nature of information and the effects that the information has 
on society.256  If the government further regulated advertising to children, 
the regulations would seem to directly advance the government’s interest 
in protecting the children, especially considering the evidence detailing the 
psychological and physical effects of advertising on children. 
Although the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test does not 
require the government to use the least restrictive means possible,257 
regulations that are substantially more restrictive than necessary fail the 
last requirement.258  Therefore, when considering prospective regulations 
for advertising to children, there should be a reasonable fit between the 
means and ends.259  Although a full ban of advertising to children like the 
bans in Sweden and Norway would not appear to be the least restrictive 
means,260 lesser regulations would substantially further the government’s 
interest while providing a justifiable means to that end.  Hypothetical 
regulations would not be imposed during times when the FTC finds that 
children do not watch much television, so adults would be able to access 
commercial information during adult programs.  In addition, “regulating 
commercials aimed at children, and not just those aired during shows 
aimed at children, would conform to the Court’s policy against restricting 
the content of speech available to adults in order to make the speech 
appropriate for children.”261 
 255. H.R. REP. NO. 101-385, at 20 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1605. 
 256. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569. 
 257. See id. at 570–71. 
 258. See Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) 
(stating that it had “not gone so far as to impose . . . the burden of demonstrating . . . 
that the manner of restriction is absolutely the least severe that will achieve the desired 
end.  What our decisions require is a fit between the legislature’s ends and the means 
chosen to accomplish those ends—a fit that is not  necessarily  perfect,  but  reasonable 
. . .” (quoting Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341 
(1986))) (internal quotations omitted). 
 259. See id; see also Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (noting that the regulation 
must not be more extensive than necessary). 
 260. See infra Part VI.B. 
 261. See Ramsey, supra note 42, at 388. 
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In the more recent case of Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly, the Supreme 
Court considered regulations that limited tobacco advertising.262  The case 
is important here because of the similarities between tobacco advertising 
and fast food advertising to children.  For example, Lorillard provides a 
window into the Court’s analysis using Central Hudson’s four-part test.263  
The regulations in Lorillard prohibited tobacco advertisements within 
1,000 feet of a school and regulated the height of in-store displays.264  The 
first two parts of the Central Hudson test were not in dispute—smoking 
was legal, the advertisements were accurate, and the public’s health was a 
substantial state interest.265  The case was decided on the final two prongs:  
whether the regulations directly advanced this state interest, and whether 
the regulations were too restrictive or “more extensive than necessary.”266  
The Court held that the regulations were too broad in that they restricted 
the right of adults to view the advertisements.267  Specifically, the Court 
noted that “‘the governmental interest in protecting children from harmful 
materials . . . does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech 
addressed to adults.’”268  The Court failed to consider all of the other 
avenues that tobacco advertisers had to reach an adult audience.269  The 
restriction was hardly a total ban, yet the Court found it too restrictive.270  
For instance, “[a] ban on the use of cartoon characters and celebrities 
in commercials aimed at children would not present the same issues that the 
Court found impermissible in cases such as Lorillard Tobacco, because 
such a ban would not significantly deny adults access to truthful 
information concerning commercial decisions.”271 Nor would a hypothetical 
ban forbid consumer access to companies’ websites, informational material, 
or product reviews; thus, the regulation should not appear too excessive.  
Further regulations would not prevent adults from receiving adequate 
information.  Instead, companies would be required to make complete 
disclosures regarding their products, and to advertise this information in a 
 262. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
 263. Id. at 554–70. 
 264. Id. at 536. 
 265. Id. at 555. 
 266. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566, 
569–70 (1980). 
 267. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 565–66. 
 268. Id. at 564 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997)). 
 269. See id. at 561–66. 
 270. See id. at 565–66. 
 271. See Ramsey, supra note 42, at 388. 
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manner that is less misleading to children.   
Therefore, increased hypothetical governmental regulations on 
advertising to children may pass the Court’s four-prong Central Hudson 
test.  Because of the Court’s continued reliance on Central Hudson, it is 
imperative for anyone seeking to protect children through advertising 
regulation to determine if the specific regulation meets the four-part 
criteria.  Because this Article does not propose a specific regulatory 
framework, but rather offers a broadly defined hypothetical example, it 
does not necessarily follow that every attempt to regulate advertising to 
children will successfully pass the Central Hudson test.  New developments 
in law and public policy will ultimately determine the bounds of Central 
Hudson and how easily regulations can pass the test.  However, regulators 
cannot neglect the current Court’s specific interest in providing concrete 
and substantial evidence for the third and fourth parts of the test.  For any 
regulation on advertising to children to pass, the necessity of such evidence 
remains undeniable. 
VI.  EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN APPROACHES TO REGULATING 
ADVERTISING DIRECTED AT CHILDREN 
Our vision and our imagination extend only as far as our experience 
permits. If all we know is American law, we prevent ourselves from 
discovering insights that have developed elsewhere.  Compared to several 
other industrialized countries, the United States lacks substantive 
regulations of advertising directed at children.272  Throughout history, 
other nations have looked to the United States as a leader in constitutional 
law and public policy.  When examining advertising law in other nations, 
however, it becomes evident that the United States has adopted a relatively 
laissez-faire approach compared to other industrialized democracies.273   
A.  Canadian Commercial Speech—Advertising Ban in Quebec 
Canada lends itself to a comparative study with the United States 
because the two nations share many similarities in public policy and 
jurisprudence.274  When regulating advertising, Canada is most notable 
 272. See Ross D. Petty, Advertising Law and Social Issues:  The Global 
Perspectives, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 309, 314–21 (1994). 
 273. See id.   
 274. See Seymour Martin Lipset, CONTINENTAL DIVIDE:  THE VALUES AND 
INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, xvii (1990) (“[I]t is precisely 
because the two North American democracies have so much in common that they 
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because of a 1980 legislative ban on nearly all commercial advertising to 
children under the age of thirteen in the province of Quebec.275  This ban 
on advertising to children also deserves special notice because it was the 
first such law in the twentieth century.276   
When enacting the ban, the major concern was for the vulnerability of 
children, because they were thought to be easily misled and deceived and 
not reasonably capable of self-protection.277  Lawmakers were particularly 
concerned about the health of children.278  The specific regulations of the 
Quebec ban are as follows: 
Subject to what is provided in the regulations, no person may make use 
of commercial advertising directed at persons under thirteen years of 
age.  To determine whether or not an advertisement is directed at 
persons under thirteen years of age, account must be taken of the 
context of its presentation, and in particular of 
(a)  the nature and intended purpose of the goods advertised; 
(b)  the manner of presenting such advertisement; 
(c)  the time and place it is shown.279 
To apply the above regulations and to help advertisers understand the 
above criteria, the Office of Consumer Protection created guidelines to 
follow when broadcasting advertisements on television.  The chart below 
illustrates the guidelines: 
 
 
permit . . . insights into the factors that cause variations.”).    
 275. See Attorney Gen. of Que. v. Irwin Toy, Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 938 
(Can). 
 276. See CORRINA HAWKES, WORLD HEALTH ORG., MARKETING FOOD TO 
CHILDREN:  THE GLOBAL REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 20 (2004) (referencing bans 
on advertising to children in Sweden since 1991, Norway since 1992, and Quebec since 
1980). 
 277. See Attorney Gen. of Que., [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 987 (restating the rationale 
for the ban on advertising to children as “[t]he concern . . . for the protection of a group 
which is particularly vulnerable to techniques of seduction and manipulation abundant 
in advertising”).   
 278. See Jeffery, supra note 45, at 239, 239 n.12.   
 279. Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q., ch. P-40.1, §§ 248–49 (2009) (Can.), 
available at http://www.canlii.org/en/qc/laws/stat/rsq-c-p-40.1/latest/rsq-c-p-40.1.html. 
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Despite opposition to the Quebec restrictions on advertising, the 
Supreme Court of Canada upheld the ban on advertising to children, ruling 
 
 280. Jeffery, supra note 45, at 242.  The chart summarizes Office de la 
Protection du Consummateur, Regulation Respecting the Application of Consumer 
Protection Act (2004) (Can.), which is an English version of the guide that discusses 
sections 248–249 of the Consumer Protection Act. 
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that the restrictions were an acceptable regulation of commercial freedom 
in Attorney General of Québec v. Irwin Toy, Ltd.281  Specifically, the Court 
found that:  
the objective of regulating commercial advertising directed at children 
accords with a general goal of consumer protection legislation, viz. to 
protect a group that is most vulnerable to commercial manipulation . . . 
[is] reflected in general contract doctrine.  Children are not as 
equipped as adults to evaluate the persuasive force of advertising and 
advertisements directed at children would take advantage of this.282   
The Irwin Toy Court used the prior framework established by Canada’s 
Supreme Court in R. v. Oakes to determine the constitutionality of the 
statutory restriction on commercial advertising directed at children.283   
In Oakes, the Canadian Supreme Court created a framework for 
future courts to use when restricting speech, and that framework bears 
similarity to the Central Hudson test used in the United States.284  First, all 
restrictions on commercial speech in Canada require a decision on whether 
the limitation is worthy enough to override the constitutionally protected 
commercial speech.285  Next, the court must inquire whether the method 
 281. Attorney Gen. of Que., [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1004–05. 
 282. Id. at 990 (citations omitted). 
 283. See id. at 933; see also The Queen v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can).  In 
addition to the Oakes ruling, the court relied heavily on a 1981 United States Federal 
Trade Commission Final Staff Report and Recommendation, which found that 
children do not perceive bias in advertising and their life experience is insufficient to 
help them counter-argue when confronted with advertisements.  See Attorney Gen. of 
Que., [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 994–1000.  Furthermore, children are not able to evaluate 
child-oriented advertising because commercials enhance the product through 
persuasive means.  ELLIOT ET AL., supra note 36, at 25. 
 284. Oakes and Central Hudson are similar, but differ greatly in the first step 
of the process.  In Canada, all speech is considered worthy of protection, and, 
therefore, all speech has the chance to be reviewed regardless of legality.  On the other 
hand, in the United States, courts first determine whether the speech in question is 
legal and protected under the First Amendment.  Compare Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 
138–40 (requiring a governmental measure to be of sufficient importance and the 
means employing it reasonable and justified), with Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–64 (1986) (holding that to be regulated, speech 
must be found to be in a category subject to government regulation and that regulation 
must advance a substantial government interest).   
 285. The Queen v. Edwards Books & Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, 768 (Can.) 
(reiterating the Oakes analysis and further asserting that in order to pass the first step 
of Oakes, the restriction placed upon the speech “must bear on a ‘pressing and 
substantial concern’”) (citation omitted). 
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and process used to achieve the objective are proportional to the 
objective.286  Because of the difficulty in determining proportionality, the 
court must consider whether the process used to restrict speech is rationally 
linked to the objective, whether the process impedes a constitutional right 
as little as possible, and whether the detrimental effects of the method used 
to achieve the objective are proportional to the salutary effects.287  Since 
the Court’s ruling in Oakes, the framework has been applied specifically to 
disputes governing the regulation of commercial speech directed at 
children, including to hold the Quebec ban on advertising to children 
constitutional.288 
B.  European Solutions 
Similar to Canada, many European nations also regulate advertising 
to children more rigorously and strictly than does the United States.  
Within the European Union, no uniform advertising law exists pertaining 
to children, but each member state oversees its individual regulation.  
Although there is no uniform standard, most regulations fit within two 
broad categories.  The first concerns the scheduling of advertising, which 
relates to the “timing, frequency, and the amount of advertising aimed at 
children.”289  The second category of regulations concerns the content of 
advertising, which places restrictions on advertisements for specific 
products such as toys, food, and medicines.290  It is important to note that 
these regulations are not limited to television advertising, though that is 
their primary aim.  The regulations also control sponsorships, children’s 
clubs, and other means of directing advertising at children.291 
The different regulatory schemes reflect the various value systems 
among European nations.292  There are three predominant and related 
values that underlie European recognition of children as potentially 
vulnerable to commercial advertising: (1) “respect for children’s 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id.; see also Rocket v. Royal Coll. of Dental Surgeons, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232, 
249–50 (Can.). 
 288. Attorney Gen. of Que. v. Irwin Toy, Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 999 (Can.). 
 289. GUNTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 142. 
 290. See id.  
 291. Id. at 143. 
 292. See generally Brian Young et al., Attitudes of Parents Towards Advertising 
to Children in the UK, Sweden and New Zealand, 19 J. MARKETING MGMT. 475 (2003) 
(tracking cultural attitudes towards advertising to children in the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, and New Zealand). 
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developing educational needs,” (2) “fairness, or not exposing children to 
sophisticated advertising messages before they develop awareness of 
persuasion,” and (3) “avoidance of exposure to adult content.”293 
Some nations restrict the type of commercials directed at children, 
while others restrict the hours advertisers may utilize.  For instance, in 
Belgium, all advertisements are banned within “five minutes before and 
after commercial-free programs for children under 12.”294 Austria takes the 
regulation even further, banning all advertisements during children’s 
programs before 8:15 p.m.295  German law also prohibits advertising breaks 
in children’s programming and completely bans corporate sponsorship of 
programs directed at children.296  On the other hand, Greece bans toy 
commercials between the hours of 7:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. and allows no 
advertisements for war toys during any time of programming.297  With its 
unique law, “Finland mandates that children in commercials may not talk 
about the products [being advertised] and can only appear in a ‘passive 
role’ in advertisements for sweets.”298  In France, famous people may not 
appear in advertising to children, nor may they present any sort of sales 
pitch, or even wear colors associated with a specific brand.299  The 
Netherlands requires that a toothbrush be pictured in all candy 
advertising.300  Certainly, the creative regulations European nations use to 
protect their children deserve careful consideration in the United States.  
As demonstrated in Europe, the possibilities for regulating advertising are 
endless; with many foreign regulations as working examples, crafting a 
public policy catered specifically to the needs of the United States is 
possible. 
The strongest regulations for advertisements directed at children can 
be found in Sweden.  In Sweden, consumers are assumed to be vulnerable 
 293. GUNTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 142 (citing J. BLUMLER, TELEVISION AND 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST:  VULNERABLE VALUES IN WESTERN EUROPE (1992)). 
 294. Janice H. Kang, Barbie Banished from the Small Screen:  The Proposed 
European Ban on Children’s Television Advertising, 21 Nw. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 543, 547 
(2001); see also GUNTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 140 (indicating the same five-minute 
limitation before and after children’s programs). 
 295. Kang, supra note 294, at 547.  
 296. James Geary, Childhood’s End?, TIME INT’L. ED., Aug. 2, 1999. 
 297. Kang, supra note 294, at 545. 
 298. Id. at 547. 
 299. Laurel Wentz, Next Challenge:  Re-regulation, ADVER. AGE, Sept. 10, 
1990, at 59. 
 300. J.J. Boddewyn, Advertising Regulation in The 1980s:  The Underlying 
Global Forces, 46 J. MARKETING. 27, 28 (1982). 
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in the marketplace; therefore, protecting the consumer is considered to be 
the job of the government.301  Unlike in the United States, in Sweden 
public policy acknowledges that “there exist large groups of consumers 
who, owing to low incomes, deficient education and knowledge of the 
market, etc., are less well equipped than the average citizen for their role as 
consumers.”302  Swedish laws ban all television advertising targeting 
children below the age of twelve.303  The ban includes not only toy 
advertisements, but also commercials for foods high in fat and sugar such 
as sweets and fast food.304  In other words, advertisements for the products 
can be aired if the targets of the advertisements are not children.305  For 
example, commercials for toys, sweets, and foods high in fat may be aired 
only if the advertisements are designed to attract and inform adults as 
opposed to children.306  What may surprise many Americans307 is that 
 301. See Ulf Bernitz, Consumer Protection:  Aims, Methods, and Trends in 
Swedish Consumer Law, 20 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. IN L. 26, 28 (1976) (indicating that 
the trend in Sweden and other Nordic countries is to leave consumer protection to the 
state). 
 302. Id. at 14. 
 303. 7 ch. 4 § The Radio and Television Act (SFS 1996:844) (“Commercial 
advertising in a television broadcast may not be designed to attract the attention of 
children under 12 years of age.”).  
 304. Nick Higham, Industry Divided over Prospect of Ban on Children’s 
Advertising, MARKETING WK., July 8, 1999, at 17. 
 305. Richard Tomkins, Selling to a Captivated Market, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 23, 
1999, available at PROQUEST, doc. ID 40779788. 
 306. See id. 
 307. The surprise derives from the fact that Americans are characterized by an 
intense individualism not common in European nations like Sweden.  See EVERETT 
CARLL LADD, THE AMERICAN IDEOLOGY:  AN EXPLORATION OF THE ORIGINS, 
MEANING, AND ROLE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEAS 3–22 (1994) (explaining that 
there are vast differences between Americans and Europeans when it comes to 
individualism). 
    The United States’ support of children as they enter higher education or the 
workplace is inadequate in comparison to European nations, including Sweden.  See 
Thomas D. Cook & Frank Furstenberg, Jr., Explaining Aspects of the Transition to 
Adulthood in Italy, Sweden, Germany, and the United States:  A Cross-Disciplinary, 
Case Synthesis Approach, 580  ANNALS. AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 272 (2002).  The 
authors performed a comparative study of assistance provided to teenagers in many 
nations including the United States.  Id. at 258.  In Sweden, the state and businesses 
cooperate to help train young people for jobs.  Id. at 267.  The future workers are  
supported after high school to study at a university or to learn to work, with 
the clear expectation that this support is for promoting self-reliant individuals 
and active citizens . . . [w]hen unemployment occurs, past work will be 
rewarded but prolonged inactivity will not, though enough is provided to keep 
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almost ninety percent of Swedish advertising professionals are in favor of 
the ban on advertising to children.308—they recognize advertising to 
children as misleading because children do not understand the commercial 
nature and purpose of advertising.309  Similarly, Norway has content-based 
regulation for protecting children which is as strict as Sweden’s ban.  The 
Norwegian ban broadly states that “[a]dvertisements may not be broadcast 
in connection with children’s programmes, nor may advertisements be 
specifically directed at children.”310  
Studying laws of other industrialized nations on advertising to 
children gives legal scholars, politicians, and regulators in the United States 
the opportunity to explore the many possibilities available when shaping 
the contours of future commercial speech regulation.  By examining the 
various strengths and weaknesses of policy in other nations, the best 
approach can be formulated.  Canada, Sweden, Norway, and other 
European nations pave the way for the increased protection of children in 
the twenty-first century, providing the United States with models of 
possible regulation and of possible balances between free speech and the 
need for regulation. 
VII.  COUNTERARGUMENTS:  THE NECESSITY OF ROBUST COMMERCIAL 
SPEECH PROTECTIONS 
Because Congress and the Court have yet to take a definite stance on 
regulating advertising to children, the debate continues.  However, before 
one can determine whether a regulation falls within the bounds of 
constitutionality, one must define those bounds.  Therein lies the problem.  
The bounds of the First Amendment to protect speech can be defined in 
two ways:  (1) as a positive grant of power, or  (2) as a negative limitation 
on government authority.311  Proponents of regulation subscribe to the first 
life and limb together.   
Id. at 272.  Conversely, in the United States “the main assumption is that individuals 
should get ahead by themselves by virtue of their own willpower and initiative, 
provided that the institutions are in place from which they can benefit, primarily 
schools and colleges.”  Id. at 282.   
 308. Roger Harrabin, A Commercial Break for Parents, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), 
Sept. 8, 1998, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/a-
commercial=break-for-parents-1196811.html.  
 309. Id. 
 310. Broadcasting Act of 4 Dec. 1992, No. 127, Sec. 3-1 (Norway).  
 311. See Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform:  Specious Arguments, 
Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1258–59 (1994) (exploring whether the 
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position.  Opponents of regulation reject this affirmative interpretation of 
the First Amendment.  They perceive the Amendment’s function as a 
limitation on government power.312  The words “[C]ongress shall make no 
law” are interpreted as an express limit on the government’s ability to 
regulate political speech.313  Under this interpretation, the First 
Amendment does not grant the government any authority to regulate 
political speech.314  The struggle between the positive power of the 
government and the negative limitation on government authority set the 
scene for opposing viewpoints on regulating advertising to children. 
For the most part, those arguing in favor of regulations for advertising 
directed at children make this basic argument:  Well-educated and 
informed children are essential for the promulgation of our nation and 
government.  Children are not miniature adults, and they do not interpret 
and process information in the same manner as adults.  Thus, children 
deserve special protection.315  The argument focuses mainly on the amount 
First Amendment can be conceptualized as a positive grant of power).   
 312. See Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks:  Speech, Corruption, Equality, and 
Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45, 76 (1997) (“The plain purpose of the First 
Amendment was to limit the authority of the government to regulate speech.”); see 
also Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence:  A Threat to Liberty, in 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 225 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992) 
(interpreting the purpose of the First Amendment to be protecting liberty of 
expression from government interference).   
 313. Smith, supra note 312, at 66 (noting that the “very language . . . 
government ‘shall not’ act, makes clear” that public debate was to be achieved by 
protecting liberty interests from government interference).  Allowing an “activist 
government” to promote public debate would thus be inconsistent with the 
Amendment’s principle.  See Wanda Franz & James Bopp, Jr., The Nine Myths of 
Campaign Finance Reform, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 63, 64 (1998).  The first myth, 
according to Franz and Bopp, is:  “The First Amendment is a Loophole Which Should 
be Narrowed or Closed.”  Id.  The authors debunk this myth by arguing that the 
purpose of the First Amendment is to protect free speech and not to promote public 
debate.  Id.  The Amendment is thus not a loophole that needs to be closed; it should 
be as wide open as possible for it is “a guardian of our citizens’ freedom” and a 
“safeguard[] not only [of] free speech, but [of] our entire system of representative self-
government.”  Id.    
 314. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 145 (1959) (Black, J., 
dissenting) (noting the importance of preserving the First Amendment right to free 
speech because it allows citizens to “praise, criticize or discuss . . . all governmental 
policies” under the auspices of the Constitution). 
 315. See Angela J. Campbell, Ads2Kids.com:  Should Government Regulate 
Advertising to Children on the World Wide Web?, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 311, 320–25 (1997) 
(exploring purposes served by restricting advertising to children); see also Patricia 
Aufderheide, Reregulating Children’s TV, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 87, 91–92 (1989) 
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of time children spend, unattended, in front of the television, coupled with 
children’s inability to distinguish advertising material from program 
content.316  This argument’s companion comes in a similar form but with 
different language.  Because most proponents of regulation of children’s 
television understand the financial nature of advertising,317 they couple 
their arguments with one that is economically persuasive.318  This argument 
attacks the basic premise of the economic model—rationality.319  At their 
developmental level children cannot be said to be rational choosers.  
Targeting children with advertising campaigns therefore violates the 
market protections that are said to exist with rational choosers.  
Advertisers also have little incentive to target children because they lack 
both purchasing power and influence over parental purchasing decisions.320   
One major concern that critics of regulating commercial speech cite is 
the tendency of the government to be paternalistic in regulation.  Justices 
Antonin Scalia and John Paul Stevens share “aversion towards 
paternalistic governmental policies that prevent men and women from 
(discussing the need for effective children’s television regulation); Henry John 
Uscinski, Deregulating Commercial Television:  Will the Marketplace Watch Out for 
Children?, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 141 (1984) (arguing that the FCC’s decision not to 
specifically regulate advertising to children violates its duty to the public). 
 316. See Aufderheide, supra note 315, at 92; see also Diane Aden Hayes, The 
Children’s Hour Revisited:  The Children’s Television Act of 1990, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 
293, 294 (1994) (stating that “[c]hildren’s high susceptibility to advertising and lack of 
power in the marketplace have been the main justifications for regulating broadcasting 
aimed at them”).  
 317. See, e.g., Hayes, supra note 316, at 325 (indicating the market concerns for 
broadcasters when the FCC regulates). 
 318. See, e.g., Uscinski, supra note 315, at 167 (explaining that “the child-
audience has limited purchasing power, [and] its influence over an advertiser-
supported medium is slight”). 
 319. See generally Piety, supra note 11 (asserting that the extension of First 
Amendment protection in the Commercial Speech Doctrine rests on the assumption of 
rationality in the public).  Advertising is protected because people are assumed to be 
rational enough to see through “puffing.”  Id. at 383.  Advertising’s fallacious affronts 
to reason are easily counterbalanced by people’s ability to “sort out information from 
indoctrination.”  Id.  The author asserts that the Supreme Court’s stance in this regard 
is denial and wishful thinking.  Id.  Piety further draws parallels between advertising 
and the psychology of addiction.  Id. at 422–37.  She states, “[b]oth appear to be 
characterized by denial, escapism, narcissism, isolation, insatiability, impatience, and 
diminished sensitivity.”  Id. at 381. 
 320. See Uscinski, supra note 315, at 163–70 (exploring the perils that 
accompany attaching a marketplace model to children).   
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hearing facts that might not be good for them.”321  Justice Thomas sees 
regulation of advertising on the basis of the product’s potential harm as a 
limitation of the right of free speech.322  In other words, many opponents 
view the regulation of advertising to children as a form of undesirable 
paternalism.  That is, the role of protecting and rearing children should be 
left to parents.  This argument is essentially a policy proposal advocating 
parental intervention and oversight as a solution the problems associated 
with advertising to children.323  This family-oriented solution, as opposed to 
a paternalistic, government-based remedy, has long been a part of 
American rhetoric.324  However, as Justice Scalia noted in 44 Liquormart, 
“it would also be paternalism for us to prevent the people of the States 
from enacting laws that we consider paternalistic, unless we have good 
reason to believe that the Constitution itself forbids them.”325  
The argument against regulating advertising to children, however, 
seems weak because there are many instances within the law in which 
children are afforded special, often paternalistic protection.  For example, 
the attractive nuisance doctrine in tort law protects children from hazards 
on land despite their status as trespassers by giving owners a financial 
incentive to childproof their property.326  Children are not allowed to sign 
contracts for the same reason that we do not want marketers influencing 
children—the bargain is skewed heavily in favor of the powerful agent.327  
 321. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 517 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 322. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 590 (2001) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (noting that when the state seeks to silence one advertiser of a harmful 
product or idea, the state may draw parallels to many other harmful products or ideas; 
however, “all are entitled to the protection of the First Amendment”). 
 323. See Dennis Crouch, The Social Welfare of Advertising to Children, 9 U. 
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 179, 196 (2002) (questioning, however, whether an intra-
family solution would solve the entire problem). 
 324. See, e.g., MARY BETH NORTON, FOUNDING MOTHERS AND FATHERS:  
GENDERED POWER AND THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 57 (1996) (examining 
the role of family, community, and gender in the development of America’s political 
and social structures). 
 325. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 517. 
 326. See Henry v. Robert Kettell Constr. Corp., 194 N.E.2d 535, 537 (Ill. App. 
1963). 
 327. See Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 212 (explaining that the enforcement of a 
contract with a child can be limited due to a child’s lack of capacity).  That is, a lack of 
capacity “exists when a party is not competent to understand the nature and 
consequences of his acts . . . .  [H]e cannot make adequate judgments concerning his 
utility . . . .”  Id.  If contract law acknowledges that children cannot make adequate 
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Furthermore, governments place age restrictions on the purchasing of 
alcohol, cigarettes, and pornography.  The very nature of what it means to 
be a child is to announce that one needs assistance—one needs a “parent.”  
To raise a child it takes a family, teachers, business people, community 
leaders, and lawmakers—those who protect our health and safety—in 
essence, it takes a village to raise a child.328  Rather than requiring parents 
to regulate potentially harmful situations, the government would be taking 
on a more guiding role in the protection of children.329 
Furthermore, opponents argue that the FCC deemed the funding 
from advertisements necessary to continue children’s education 
programming.330  However, what opponents of such regulation fail to 
consider is that other countries have full bans on advertising, and those 
countries still provide funding for an adequate amount of television 
programing aimed at children.331  A fundamental problem with achieving 
further regulation, especially regarding unhealthy foods, is that legislators 
tend to be on the side of big business and the food industry, making it 
difficult for interest groups to influence Congress.332 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Regulations directed at advertising to children often strike a delicate 
balance with First Amendment rights.  However, given the evidence that 
judgments, should not advertising law acknowledge a minor’s lack of capacity in an 
effort to help protect children from marketers? 
 328. See First Lady Hillary Clinton, Remarks at the Democratic National 
Convention (Aug. 27, 1996) (transcript available at http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITIC 
S/1996/news/9608/27/hillary.speech/hillary.shtml); see generally NANCY FOLBRE, WHO 
PAYS FOR THE KIDS?:  GENDER AND THE STRUCTURE OF CONSTRAINT 1, 248–62(1994). 
 329. See J. Morgan, Religious Upbringing, Religious Diversity, and the Child’s 
Right to an Open Future, 24 STUD. IN PHIL. AND EDUC. 367, 370 (2005) (“If we 
influence a child such that the adult she becomes is incapable of considering important 
choices concerning her own life, then we have effectively diminished her opportunity 
for self-fulfillment”).  Morgan suggests that children are particularly vulnerable in that 
they are subject to adult influences, and need to be directed in ways that do not limit 
the formation of their character and identity.  Id. 
 330. Children’s Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, § 101, 104 Stat. 
996, 996 (1990). 
 331. KUNKEL ET AL., supra note 12, at 23. 
 332. See David Kiley, A Food Fight Over Obesity in Kids, BUS. WK. ONLINE, 
Sept. 30, 2004, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/sep2004/nf20040930_011 
0_db035.htm (noting the influence that food companies have on legislative action and 
revealing that food companies have even influenced the USDA in matters concerning 
the Food Guide Pyramid). 
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advertising to children takes advantage of the naiveté of children, enforces 
negative stereotypes, and promulgates serious health risks and obesity, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the benefits of regulating advertising 
outweigh the costs.   
Because the FTC is reluctant to regulate for the protection of children 
due to its past failure, other government entities such as the FCC and 
Congress should have a greater role in regulating advertising to children.  
The history of commercial speech through case law, although at times 
contradictory, substantiates further protection of children.  The Supreme 
Court has declared that the government has a substantial interest in 
protecting children through broadcast regulation, and applying the four-
part test of Central Hudson to a hypothetical advertising ban provides 
positive results.  The dangers wrought by advertising to children are 
palpable, and without further government regulation, future generations of 
children in the United States will face a life of manipulation, ill-informed 
consumerism, and poor health. 
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